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Article
Targeting Decisions and Consequences
Civilians in the Colombian Civil Strife

for

Aaron X. Fellmeth & Douglas J. Sylvester
Abstract
The trend in armed conflicts since 1945 has moved away
from traditional international wars and toward noninternational conflicts between the state and organized
rebellions, criminal organizations, or terrorist cells. The
difficulty of coping with an enemy that hides among civilians
without causing avoidable civilian deaths and damage to civilian
property has often been observed and, in practice, the number of
civilian deaths in such conflicts frequently overshadows
combatant deaths by a significant margin. Yet, it is a homily
among international lawyers that the principle of
proportionality applies in non-international as well as
international conflicts under customary international law. In
order to better understand the apparent contradiction of this
claim with the quotidian fact of disproportionate civilian
casualties, the authors studied the practice of Colombia in its
decades-long civil strife against the organized armed groups
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, and the
National Liberation Army, or ELN. This study summarizes
Colombian practice in training and regulating its armed forces
with respect to the specific principle of proportionality; examines
several incidents of allegedly disproportionate attacks; and
analyzes the Colombian government’s response to determine
whether it considers itself bound to comply with the
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proportionality principle in its internal conflict and, if so, how
the state interprets its compliance obligations with that
principle.
I. INTRODUCTION
The trend in armed conflicts since 1945 has moved away
from the traditional clash between sovereign states and towards
internal strife based on ethnic, religious, or other demographic
factors. These conflicts are also the ones that pose the greatest
threats to civilian populations, as the tragedies in Rwanda, the
former Yugoslavia, the Congo, Syria, and countless zones of
recurring hostilities such as occupied Palestine illustrate. One of
the obstacles to adequate protection of civilians from the effects
of non-international armed conflicts is the absence of sufficient
and clear international legal rules restraining the combatants
from military tactics that pose a morally unacceptable threat to
civilian lives and property. While international law regulating
wartime conduct, known as ius in bello,1 is highly developed, its
application in non-international armed conflicts is contested and
frequently uncertain.2 There is no universally accepted treaty
applying the entire body of the international ius in bello
developed since 1899 to civil wars, rebellions, counterterrorism
operations, and other non-international armed conflicts. The
1. In much recent scholarship, the laws of war are often termed
“international humanitarian law” in recognition of the modern focus on the
protection of individuals from unnecessary harm. However, because not all laws
of war have primarily humanitarian objectives, we adopt the more general and
laconic terms “laws of war,” or ius in bello, here.
2. The uncertainty surrounding application of the laws of war to various
conflicts has led some to conclude that they no longer serve as a viable limitation
on state action. See generally Draft Memorandum from Alberto Gonzalez,
White House Counsel, to President George W. Bush, Decision re. Application of

the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and
the
Taliban
(Jan.
25,
2002),
http://www.hereinreality.com/alberto_gonzales_torture_memo.html. To others,

this uncertainty has led to calls for redefinition and formulation of old rules to
apply to various types of conflict. See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora, International Law:
Where Have We Been; Where are We Going?, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1323 (2009)
(advocating for a restatement of the law of armed conflict to reflect new methods
of warfare); see also Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Questioning Civilian Immunity, 43
TEX. INT’L L.J. 453, 483 (2008) (noting that many critiques of modern
humanitarian law “are based upon the observation that if modern armed
conflicts expose civilians to similar or greater risks than combatants, as is often
the case, then the natural conclusion is that the necessity and proportionality
principles are either consistently disregarded or are too vague to be useful in
making responsible decisions.”).
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most widely subscribed treaty on the subject, Additional Protocol
II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, includes rules for
the protection of civilians, but the protections fall short of what
is required in its sister treaty applicable to international
conflicts, Additional Protocol I, at least in terms of specificity.3
The paradox of international law obligating states to protect
“enemy” civilians with greater rigor than their own civilians
during armed conflicts can be explained better by history than
by policy. A state’s treatment of its own civilians was
traditionally considered a matter of sovereign internal control,
beyond the purview of international law.4 A government that
victimized its own citizens in combating internal strife could
perhaps be held responsible under its national constitution and
laws, but, before 1945, it was not considered a matter of
sufficient concern to the international community except in
campaigns of widespread and severe human rights violations of
Christians.
Much has changed since the Second World War, however.
The general acceptance of human dignity as a foundation of the
world public order following the founding of the United Nations
has transformed the international community’s view of which
matters fall within the exclusive sovereignty of a state, and
which fall within the realm of human rights and beyond.5 Almost
all states now openly accept international human rights law as
binding, and that the main provisions of the international law of
armed conflict apply with equal vigor and scope to non3. See Aaron Fellmeth, The Proportionality Principle in Operation:
Methodological Limitations of Empirical Research and the Need for
Transparency, 45 ISR. L. REV. 125, 126 (2012).
4. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON GENEVA

CONVENTION IV RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME
OF WAR 46 (Jean Picet ed., 1958) (observing that the reason for excluding a
belligerent’s own nationals from the category of “protected persons” was concern
to avoid interfering with a sovereign state’s relationship with its own nationals).
5. Most states now accept that the observance of international human
rights law concerns the entire international community. See generally The
Foundation of Human Rights Law, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en
/sections/universal-declaration/foundation-international-human-rights-law/
index.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2017). Not surprisingly, the exceptions are
those states that systematically violate human rights. The Chinese
government, for example, has consistently tried to deflect international
criticism and pressure by claiming that human rights are merely an “internal
affair.” See, e.g., Info. Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China,
White Paper on Human Rights in China, Nov. 1991, pt. X,
http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/7/7-L.htm.
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international conflicts. Among these laws is the requirement
that combatants observe the principles of discrimination and
proportionality when planning and directing attacks, as
provided most explicitly in AP I.6
Unfortunately, the coherence of the policies justifying the
equal application of civilian protection law in international
armed conflicts to internal conflicts has had little effect on state
practice in some regions of the world. In the absence of specific
treaty provisions relating to targeting in non-international
armed conflicts, the primary source for detailed binding rules
remains customary international law.7 For a practice to become
binding international custom, formal doctrine dictates that it
must be sufficiently longstanding, consistent, widespread, and
accompanied by the belief that international law requires the
practice (opinio iuris sive necessitatis), as opposed to being
merely optional or advisable.8 In making the case for the
applicability of the rules of discrimination and proportionality in
internal conflicts, commentators and authorities have relied
heavily on logic, policy, and public statements, but they have
rarely studied actual battlefield practice—a reliance that has not
gone unnoticed. The United States government, for example, has
criticized the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”)
for positing custom based on published sources rather than state
practice and direct evidence of opinio iuris.9
The common reliance on public sources is hardly surprising.
Producing sound empirical evidence of international practice in
armed conflicts is a daunting task. Yet, there are reasons to
doubt whether practice in internal armed conflicts can merely be
assumed to be identical to practice in international armed
conflicts without extensive evidence, as any such practice
cannot, perforce, have a long history. As noted, the laws of war
were not viewed as applicable to a state’s treatment of its own
6. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts.
51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), (b), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 139
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
7. See MICHELLE MACK & JELENA PEJIC, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
INCREASING RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN NONINTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 9 (2008).
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
9. Letter from John B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, &
William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., to Jakob Kellenberger,
President, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross (Nov. 3, 2006), https://www.state.gov/
s/l/2006/98860.htm.
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citizens until recently.10 In addition, whatever customary
support may exist will have arisen in contexts radically different
from that of classic international armed conflict. Even verbal
statements confirming that the laws of war do apply in internal
conflicts provide uncertain guidance on whether particular
doctrines applicable in international conflicts govern internal
conflicts with the same vigor. It would not be surprising to see
states engage in a calculus to defeat the regular army of a foreign
power quite different from the calculus in an asymmetrical
conflict with an enemy indifferent to the safety of civilians, a
fortiori one willing to use civilians to shield themselves from
direct attack.11 Thus, despite strong evidence of state verbal
support for application of the laws of war to internal conflicts,
there is a real need to examine state practice to determine
whether specific doctrines are customarily treated as fully
applicable in internal wars and the manner in which they are
interpreted.
In pursuit of evidence of custom in non-international armed
conflicts, we have chosen to examine one specific aspect of the
laws of war—the doctrine of proportionality. The authors are
currently engaged in a multinational, multi-conflict empirical
study of state customary practice of proportionality since 1945.12
As traditionally understood, proportionality requires military
commanders to consider whether attacking a given target is
“expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objections or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
10. See Richard A. Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law of
Internal War, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE 185, 220 (James N.
Rosenau ed., 1964).
11. See Laurie E. Bank & Amos N. Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New
Tricks: Operationalizing the Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare , 1 HARV.
NAT’L SEC. J. 45, 46 (2010) (“The essence of new warfare is that states are
engaged with non-state actors.”); Nir Eisikovits, Proportionality and SelfInterest, 11 HUM. RTS. REV. 157, 160 (2010) (“The strict distinction between
civilians and combatants, which just war theory has focused on, may no longer
be the most useful guideline for protecting civilians during war. The changing
nature of war in the last decades and specifically the rise in the frequency of
asymmetrical conflicts require some adjustments to just war theory.”); Michael
N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian
Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 809 (2010) (arguing
that reforms to modern humanitarian law were largely driven by “two
factors . . . guerilla warfare . . . and the spread of non-international armed
conflicts. Both phenomena placed civilians and their property at particular
risk.”).
12. For more on the methodology of this study, see Fellmeth, supra note 3.
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military advantage anticipated.”13 Our study will examine how
the principle has played out in internal conflicts, and specifically
the role it plays in targeting and planning decisions as well as
state responses to alleged violations of the rule. To better
understand state practice, we are using a methodology designed
to gather empirical information beyond official governmental
and NGO publications and news reports.14
The purpose of this Article is to examine state practice in
applying the proportionality doctrine to the civil strife between
the Colombian government and two armed subversive groups,
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”) and the
National Liberation Army (“ELN”), from 1982 to the present.15
This vicious conflict, active since 1964 and still ongoing to a
lesser extent today, is notable for the large number of intentional
civilian killings and property damage. But it is also notable
because it involves numerous incidents of allegedly
indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks resulting in
accidental but avoidable civilian casualties and property
damage. Over the course of the conflict, it is estimated that some
220,000 persons have been killed,16 most of them civilians, and
many of them murdered by FARC, ELN, and paramilitary
organizations allied with the Colombian military. Our primary
goal is to examine the measures Colombia has taken to train and
prepare its armed forces in proportionality doctrine, to monitor
and enforce compliance with that doctrine, and to punish
disproportionate attacks. By examining training and
enforcement mechanisms and incidents of allegedly
disproportionate attacks from this persisting conflict, we hope to
gain some insight into the role that proportionality
considerations play in targeting decisions made by the
Colombian armed forces.

13. Additional Protocol I, supra note 6, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2); see also 1 JEANMARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 46 (2005).
14. See infra Section III.B.
15. We discuss the origins and development of these institutions in Section
III.A.
16. CENTRO NACIONAL DE MEMORIA HISTÓRICA, ¡BASTA YA! COLOMBIA:
MEMORIAS DE GUERRA Y DIGNIDAD 20 (2013).
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II. PROPORTIONALITY IN NON-INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICTS
Although the doctrine of proportionality is now well
established in the ius in bello, its application to noninternational conflicts is of more recent and, in some respects,
controversial origin. As early as Grotius and gaining steady force
throughout the eighteenth century, the notion that the “right of
belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited”17 began to take shape.18 Yet, a proportionality
principle did not immediately emerge to protect civilians, nor
was it yet a formal requirement of the laws of armed conflict
before the end of the Second World War. The laws of war first
embodied the more pressing doctrines of discrimination, which
forbids the intentional targeting of civilians, and of military
necessity, which prohibits the gratuitous use of force that could
threaten civilian lives or property.19 The protective value of
these rules is limited to those attacks that endanger civilians
and that cannot otherwise be justified for military purposes.20
For example, these principles protected civilians against attacks
on undefended towns and the random destruction of civilian
17. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land art. 22, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277. The incorporation of the doctrine into
international law can be traced back to the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868,
which states in its preamble that, because the only legitimate purpose of
warfare can be to weaken the military forces of one’s opponent, practices that
uselessly aggravate the suffering of combatants are illegitimate. See
Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under
400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR 31 (Roberts & Guelff eds., 2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter Declaration
Renouncing the Use of Explosives].
18. Josef L. Kunz, The Chaotic Status of the Laws of War and the Urgent
Necessity for Their Revision, 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 37, 37–38 (1951).
19. Although contested at times, the doctrine of necessity, as both a
limitation on the nature of legal attacks and a basis for potential criminal
liability, was best articulated in The Hostage Case. In that case, an American
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg held that necessity:
[D]oes not permit the killing of innocent inhabitants for purposes of revenge or
the satisfaction of a lust to kill. The destruction of property to be lawful must
be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. Destruction as an end in
itself is a violation of international law. There must be some reasonable
connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the
enemy forces.
United States v. List (The Hostage Case), Case No. 7 (Feb. 19, 1948), reprinted
in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL OF COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1253–54 (1950).
20. Fellmeth, supra note 2, at 455, 484.
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property.21 As late as 1952, international lawyers continued to
view the principle of discrimination as the principal limitation
under customary international law protecting civilians during
an armed attack.22
However, once the idea that the purpose of warfare was
limited to weakening the military forces of the enemy became
widely accepted,23 more detailed legal regulation of the means of
attack naturally followed. Throughout the nineteenth century,
various regimes were developed to control weapons and tactics
viewed as unnecessarily indiscriminate in their ability to
distinguish between military targets and civilians or civilian
property, and unnecessarily cruel in their effects on their
victims, whether combatant or civilian. The focus was mainly on
indiscriminate weapons or weapons causing needless suffering,
such as chemical weapons and exploding or flattening bullets.24
The terrible effects of the Second World War on civilians began
a movement to extend legal protection of civilians through a
more developed law of war. After 1945, international lawyers,
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”), and scholars began to
argue that customary international law forbids attacks that
even unintentionally threaten civilian safety and life if they
cannot be justified by military necessity.25 By the early 1970s,
21. See Geoffrey Best, Restraints on War by Land Before 1945, in
RESTRAINTS ON WAR: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATION OF ARMED CONFLICT 17, 27–
29 (Michael Howard ed., 1979).
22. See, e.g., Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law
of War, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 360, 379 (1952).
23. Declaration Renouncing the Use of Explosives, supra note 17, pmbl.
(“[T]he only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy . . . .”).
24. See, e.g., Hague Declaration (II) on the Use of Projectiles the Object of
Which is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases, July 29, 1899,
reprinted in 2 JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899
AND 1907 (1909); Hague Declaration (III) on the Use of Bullets Which Expand
or Flatten Easily in the Human Body, July 29, 1899, reprinted in SCOTT, id.;
1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163; Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
(with Protocols), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Convention on
Conventional Weapons].
25. According to Gregory Best, the work of the ICRC and numerous other
groups began to focus on civilian protections in the laws of war after 1945. See
Best, supra note 21, at 27. Others have discussed the changing landscape of war
and the increasing desire to protect civilians in internal conflicts. See Josef L.
Kunz, The Chaotic Status of the Laws of War and the Urgent Necessity for Their
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the thinking of the leaders of the international community had
begun to converge on the more nuanced view that, regardless of
the precision of the weapon employed, when civilian casualties
or property are expected as collateral damage, “the loss of life
and damage to property must not be out of proportion to the
military advantage to be gained.”26 The doctrine was enshrined
in the first major supplement to the conventional laws of war
since 1949—Additional Protocol I (“AP I”) to the Geneva
Conventions adopted in 1977.27
Additional Protocol I greatly expanded the protections of the
laws of war for civilians, but its provisions apply in international
conflicts only. Among other protections relating to methods and
means of attack,28 AP I articulates in Article 51 the
proportionality principle requiring military commanders to
refrain from an attack that is expected to cause civilian
casualties excessive in relation to the “concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.”29 Although the requirements of
“direct” and “concrete” give the appearance of strict criteria, in
practice the principle’s application remains highly subjective
and leaves broad discretion to military commanders. Those
states that resisted the inclusion of a proportionality principle in
AP I did so for a variety of reasons, one of which was that the
substance and scope of many of the rules in AP I went beyond
customary understanding and, in some cases, could result in
criminal liability for military commanders acting in good faith
and with reasonable care to achieve legitimate military
objectives.30 Nonetheless, the principle was included with strong
support from most states, possibly because they may not have
viewed a violation of the proportionality principle as a war
crime. Subsequent history has borne out that expectation; there
are exceedingly few known instances of military commanders

Revision, 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 37 (1951).
26. Letter from J. Fred Buzhardt, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def., to
Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Refugees of the
Comm. of the Judiciary (Sept. 22, 1972), reprinted in 67 AM. J. INT’L L. 122,
124–25 (1973).
27. Additional Protocol I, supra note 6, art. 51(5)(b).
28. Id. arts. 51(4)(c), (5)(a).
29. Id. art. 51(5)(b).
30. For a discussion of the numerous objections raised by states to adoption
of AP I, see Schmitt, supra note 11, at 811–14, and Fellmeth, supra note 2, at
485–89.

510

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:2

being prosecuted criminally at the international or national level
for having committed a disproportionate attack.31
Regardless of whether proportionality in international
armed conflicts possessed a strong customary basis prior to
adoption of AP I, there is little reason to believe that
proportionality enjoyed a similar customary basis for noninternational conflicts. Indeed, the promulgation of Additional
Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (“AP
II”), which was to extend humanitarian legal protection to
noncombatants in non-international conflicts such as civil wars
or counterterrorism operations, implicitly disclaimed a
customary basis for extending international law’s protections for
a state’s own citizens during internal conflicts.32 Consequently,
the promulgation of AP II put protection for civilians in noninternational conflicts on a new conventional footing, with that
protocol being the primary source of state legal obligations
toward civilians beyond the lex generalis of international human
rights law.33
Some states willing to adhere to AP I were less enthusiastic
about AP II. First, traditional concerns about state sovereignty,
enhanced in the dozens of states emerging from decades of
colonization and contested leadership, brought suspicion with
new international rules restricting state sovereignty within the
state’s own borders.34 In addition, it was widely, though naively,
believed that nations were much less likely to disregard the
safety of their own nationals during internal conflicts than
might be the case for civilians of an enemy state.35 As a result,
such civilians were viewed as less needful of international law’s
protections. Finally, some states objected to the treatment of
irregular armed forces who hide among civilian populations as

31. See Fellmeth, supra note 3, at 127–29.
32. Cf. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, pmbl., Dec.
7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II] (listing a major
reason for the protocol as “the need to ensure a better protection for the victims
of . . . armed conflicts.”).
33. See MACK & PEJIC, supra note 7.
34. See, e.g., Mark David Maxwell & Richard V. Meyer, The Principle of
Distinction: Probing the Limits of Its Customariness, THE ARMY LAWYER, Mar.
2007, at 1, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/03-2007.pdf.
35. CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 1449–51 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
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entitled to the same privileges as regular combatants who
readily distinguish themselves by the open wearing of uniforms
and carrying of arms.36 Some thirty states (including the United
States and Israel) chose not to ratify AP II. More importantly,
unlike the rules of war in international conflicts, which most
states readily admit qualify as customary, the customary rules
of war in non-international armed conflicts were viewed as
distinctly limited.37
The relative dearth of specific protections for civilians in
non-international armed conflicts in AP II, and the absence of
several militarily active states from the list of parties to the
treaty, leaves custom as the main source of detailed legal
obligations for the protection of civilians in internal conflicts. As
internal conflicts became increasingly prevalent and destructive
during the politically turbulent 1980s and 90s, human rights
advocates sought to identify customary rules to buttress their
claims that international law mandates respect for the
discrimination and proportionality principles in internal as well
as international conflict. Decisions of international criminal and
human rights tribunals,38 as well as important studies by the
ICRC,39 argued forcefully that customary international law now
fully incorporates the laws of war normally applicable in
conflicts between states into purely internal conflicts.
International lawyers, too, frequently argue that the laws of war
applicable to the treatment of civilians in international armed
conflicts apply equally to civilians in non-international
conflicts.40 After all, human dignity does not vary according to
36. Id. at 1451–52.
37. See, e.g., Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Rule 11. Indiscriminate Attacks,
CUSTOMARY IHL, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_
rul_rule11 (last visited Mar. 22, 2017) (demonstrating the difference between
international and non-international conflicts when it comes to having an
established customary law principle).
38. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defense
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 119 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (“What is inhumane, and consequently
proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in
civil strife.”); id. ¶ 127 (“[I]t cannot be denied that customary rules have
developed to govern internal strife. These rules . . . cover such areas as
protection of civilians from hostilities, in particular from indiscriminate attacks
. . . as well as prohibition of means of warfare proscribed in international armed
conflicts and ban of certain methods of conducting hostilities.”).
39. The most influential and impressive example so far is JEAN-MARIE
HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005) [hereinafter ICRC Study].
40. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion
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nationality. Consequently, it is desirable and logical for
international law to protect civilians in both cases equally.
Unfortunately, there is reason to doubt whether states
conceive of the customary legal regime governing noninternational armed conflicts, especially the proportionality
principle, as coextensive with that applying in international
conflicts. To understand the state of customary international law
in internal conflicts, it is first necessary to survey state practice
and opinio iuris to determine whether states do in fact treat
proportionality as an operative principle in non-international
armed conflicts and, if so, how they interpret that principle. It is
a platitude of modern ius in bello that the “main problem with
the principle of proportionality is not whether or not it exists but
what it means and how it is be applied.”41 For this, customary
practice remains the best source for gaining insight into the
nature and extent of proportionality in non-international
conflicts. As a result, our project seeks to examine state practice
with regard to this very issue and will, we hope, shed light on
the nature and extent of the customary law content of
proportionality in the ius in bello. Our project, in particular,
seeks to uncover practice that may illuminate, inter alia, the
following issues:
• To what extent, and how, do states incorporate
training in the proportionality principle into the
mandatory military education of commanding
officers?
• By what procedures, if any, do military
organizations make decisions whether to refrain
from or alter an attack on proportionality grounds in
planning and executing military operations?
• To what extent, and how, are states influenced in
their military engagements with domestic military
opponents by the principle of proportionality?
• What level of intentionality (e.g., negligence,
recklessness) is required to subject a military
of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 5, 13 (2010) (stating

that it is “beyond dispute” that the principle of distinction, in both international
and non-international conflicts, is part of customary international law);
Maxwell & Meyer, supra note 34, at 10 (“The principle [of proportionality]
transcends conflict categorization [as international or non-international].”).
41. INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, FINAL
REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR OF THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE
NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA ¶
48 (2000), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/nato061300.pdf
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commander to responsibility for disproportionate
attack?
• Do
states
monitor
compliance
with the
proportionality principle and punish commanders
who engage in disproportionate attacks and, if so, by
what sanctions?
• And, in cases where insurgents or terrorists may be
supported, politically, morally, or economically, by
civilians, do states interpret proportionality
differently than in cases where civilians are hostile
to these factions?
The present study discusses Colombia’s practice in this area
over its principal non-international armed conflict since 1990.
Because that conflict continued actively for many decades, it
furnishes a particularly instructive basis for evaluating how at
least one state has conceived and operationalized the principle.
III.

THE COLOMBIAN CIVIL STRIFE

This section sets out the background of the Colombian
internal conflict and analyzes a series of actions taken by the
government to suppress or defeat FARC. These actions may shed
some light on the substance of the proportionality doctrine in
non-international conflicts as interpreted by Colombia.
A. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF COLOMBIAN CIVIL STRIFE
As of 2016, Colombia maintains a National Army with some
237,000 active personnel, an Air Force with approximately
13,000 active personnel, and a paramilitary National Police
Force 159,000 strong.42 Its equipment is relatively modern,
although for the most part it is not highly technologically
sophisticated.43 The size and expertise of the Colombian armed
forces is partly attributable to United States financial
assistance, which included some $6 billion to counter-narcotics
operations between 2000 and 2008.44

42. Int’l Inst. for Strategic Studies, Latin America and the Caribbean, 116
MIL. BALANCE 365, 389 (2016).
43. See id. at 389–92.
44. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-71, PLAN COLOMBIA: DRUG
REDUCTION GOALS WERE NOT FULLY MET, BUT SECURITY HAS IMPROVED; U.S.
AGENCIES NEED MORE DETAILED PLANS FOR REDUCING ASSISTANCE 2 (2008).
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Colombia faces three sets of challengers to its national
sovereignty. The largest by far has historically been Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC, which has
historically varied in membership from about 8,000 to 17,000
fighters.45 The much less active Ejército de Liberación Nacional,
or ELN, was formed in 196446 and is currently comprised of
around 2,000 members.47 A third, composed of relatively nonunified groups of upwards of 2,600 drug traffickers armed mostly
with light weapons, the government calls BACRIM, for Bandas
Criminales Emergentes.48 Because it is the best organized and
funded of the groups, as well as the most aggressive, the
incidents in the present study primarily involved FARC.
Although FARC’s rise can be traced back to the failure of
agrarian reforms in the 1920s and 30s, its more immediate
beginning arose out of a particularly bloody period in Colombia’s
history, colloquially known as La Violencia, lasting from 1948–
58.49 Following a period of tensions between Marxist, liberal, and
conservative political factions, the assassination of a prominent
leftist politician, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, in 194850 led to a
protracted violent clash between conservative government
soldiers, conservative and liberal guerilla units, and Marxist
peasant militias that lasted until a military coup in 1953.51 The
coup leader declared an amnesty, resulting in the demobilization
of most guerilla forces.52
Those bandoleros who refused to surrender continued
fighting. After political factions reached an agreement in 1958,
45. Id. at 25.
46. Stanford University, National Liberation Army (Colombia), MAPPING
MILITANT ORG. (Aug. 17, 2015), http://web.stanford.edu/group/mapping
militants/cgi-bin/groups/view/87.
47. Danielle Renwick & Claire Felter, Colombia’s Civil Conflict, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 11, 2017), http://www.cfr.org/colombia/colombiascivil-conflict/p9272.
48. See Las “Bandas Criminales Emergentes,” EL ESPECTADOR (Mar. 3,
2009,
11:00
PM),
http://www.elespectador.com/articulo123678-bandascriminales-emergentes; Pablo Medina Uribe, Explainer: After the FARC,
Colombia Still Has to Face Bacrim, AMERICAS SOC’Y/COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS
(Jan 6, 2016), http://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-after-farc-colombia-stillhas-face-bacrim.
49. GARRY LEECH, THE FARC: THE LONGEST INSURGENCY 8, 21
(2011).
50. Tasneem Jamal, Colombia (1964–First Combat Deaths), PROJECT
PLOUGHSHARES (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACR
Text/ACR-Colombia.html#Background.
51. See LEECH, supra note 49, at 9–10.
52. Id.
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what remained was armed communist peasant groups.53 The
remnants of the communist rebels organized into FARC.54 FARC
initially declared its intention to seize power in Colombia
through “armed colonization”55 and, for more than two decades,
organized peasant revolts in mainly rural areas throughout the
Colombian countryside.56 FARC’s methods include ambushing
patrols, assassinations, kidnapping and murdering Colombian
political leaders, destroying infrastructure, recruiting child
soldiers (about one quarter of whom are under 18 years old), and
terrorizing villagers in the countryside.57
During most of the conflict until the end of the Álvaro Uribe
administration from 2002–10, the Colombian government
denied it was engaged in an armed conflict, but instead
characterized the conflict as a law enforcement action against
criminal groups.58 By the early 1980s, however, FARC had
begun to link itself to the burgeoning cocaine trade in the
country and, backed by the immense funds from their
participation in drug trafficking, greatly expanded its size and
military training.59 Throughout the 1980s, it directly attacked
the Colombian military and moved into more urban areas of the

53. Id. at 10.
54. See Fernán E. González, The Colombian Conflict in Historical
Perspective, 14 ACCORD 10, 13 (2004) http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/
colombia/historical-perspective.php.
55. Ricardo Vargas Meza, The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) and the Illicit Drug Trade, TRANSNAT’L INST. (June 7, 1999),
https://www.tni.org/en/briefing/revolutionary-armed-forces-colombia-farc-andillicit-drug-trade.
56. LEECH, supra note 49, at 16.
57. See MARIO A. MURRILLO & JESÚS REY AVIRAMA, COLOMBIA AND THE
UNITED STATES: WAR, UNREST AND DESTABILIZATION 74 (2004); see also
Colombia: Armed Groups Send Children to War, HUMAN RTS. WATCH (Feb. 22,
2005),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/02/21/colombia-armed-groups-sendchildren-war; FARC-Civilians, UPPSALA CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM,
http://ucdp.uu.se/#/onesided/1072 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); HUM. RTS. WATCH,
COLOMBIA: BEYOND NEGOTIATION: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND
ITS APPLICATION TO THE CONDUCT OF THE FARC-EP, pts. III, VII, VIII & IX,
Vol. 13 No. 3B (Aug. 2001), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/farc/index.htm.
58. Interview with Senator Germán Navas Talero, May 23, 2012,
[hereinafter Talero Interview] (on file with the author); Guillermo Otálora
Lozano & Sebastián Machado, The Objective Qualification of Non-International
Armed Conflicts: A Colombian Case Study, 4 AMSTERDAM L.F. 58, 65–66, 70
(2012).
59. Stanford University, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia –
People’s Army, MAPPING MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS (Aug. 15, 2015),
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/print_view/89.
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country.60 In addition to drug trafficking, in the 1980s FARC
began kidnapping affluent and well-connected Colombian
citizens and foreigners for ransom, an activity that greatly
increased its funding and notoriety.61
Following
a
series
of
negotiations,
amnesties,
demobilizations, and some short-lived progress toward
reconciliation with FARC, violence once again escalated in the
early 1990s as conservatives formed a number of paramilitary
forces (known as the convivir) and began a campaign of extreme
violence against FARC and other guerrilla forces.62 The level of
violence continued to escalate between these paramilitary
groups, suspected to be linked to the Colombian government,
and FARC. In 2001, the United States declared FARC a “Foreign
Terrorist Organization” subject to United States trade and
economic sanctions63 and increased funding and military
support for the Colombian government’s efforts to defeat
FARC.64 FARC was also designated a terrorist organization by
the European Union, Canada, and, of course, Colombia itself.65
Less known than FARC, a second insurgent group, the ELN
has also been waging war against the Colombian government
since the mid 1960s. ELN, deeply influenced by “liberation
theology,” was also listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by
the United States66 and, since 2004, has been designated a
terrorist organization by the European Union as well.67 ELN,
like FARC, has used kidnapping and extortion to fund its
campaigns against the Colombian government.68 Although in
60. LEECH, supra note 49, at 25.
61. Id. at 40.
62. Id. at 29–33; see also James Bargent, The Legacy of Colombia’s
Vigilante Security: the Convivir, INSIGHT CRIME (May 25, 2015),
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/the-legacy-of-colombia-vigilantesecurity-the-convivir.
63. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2001 REPORT ON FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS (Oct. 5, 2001), https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/2001/
5258.htm.
64. LEECH, supra note 49, at 86–87.
65. Will a Peace Agreement Boost Trade and Investment in Colombia? ,
KNOWLEDG@WHARTON (Aug. 24, 2016), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
article/will-peace-agreement-boost-trade-investment-colombia/.
66. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 63.
67. Council Decision 2005/930/EC of 21 December 2005, Implementing
Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No. 2580/2001 on Specific Restrictive Measures
Directed Against Certain Persons and Entities with a View to Combating
Terrorism and Repealing Decision 2005/848/EC, 2005 O.J. (L 340/64).
68. Norman Offstein, An Historical Review and Analysis of Colombian
Guerilla Movements: FARC, ELN and EPL, 52 DESARROLLO Y SOCIEDAD 99,

2017]

COLOMBIAN CIVIL STRIFE

517

recent years reconciliation talks with ELN proved effective at
reducing violence, the 2009 escape of an ELN leader from prison
has since escalated the ELN’s profile and activity.69
From 2002 to the present, the Colombian military has
undertaken a series of increasingly forceful measures to defeat
FARC and ELN.70 The declared intention of these organizations
to seize political and military control of the country by force, and
their willingness to flout all aspects of the laws of war, furnishes
an instructive example of a state coping with intense and
protracted warfare against an organized domestic armed group
frequently integrated into civilian populations.
B. OUR METHODOLOGY AND ITS LIMITATIONS
Here, we summarize our methodology for identifying and
analyzing the incidents that we deemed relevant to assessing
the
Colombian
government’s
interpretation
of
the
proportionality principle in the Colombian civil strife. A key goal
of the study is to move beyond formal, documentary evidence of
customary law and to analyze actual training and battlefield
practice and subsequent treatment of incidents by the
Colombian military, the civilian government, and international
institutions. This entailed a more journalistic and resourceintensive methodology than that typically devoted to the study
of custom. Normally, such a study might include treaty
obligations, judicial opinions, military manuals, national
legislation, public statements of national government officials,
UN Security Council resolutions, and similar sources. The ICRC
study has already covered most of this ground on a global scale.71
Although the ICRC study received some criticism for its
methodology, commentators implicitly endorse the study’s
importance by almost acknowledging the nearly insuperable
difficulty of assessing state practice and opinio iuris based on
actual battlefield events on a global scale.72 Indeed, the
112 (2003).
69. Jeremy McDermott, Colombia’s ELN Rebels Show New Vigour, BBC
NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8341093.stm (last updated Nov. 5,
2009).
70. Profiles: Columbia’s Armed Groups, BBC NEWS (Aug. 23, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-11400950.
71. See generally HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 13.
72. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of Targeting, in PERSPECTIVES
ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 131,
135, 156 (Elizabeth Wilmhurst & Susan Breau eds., 2007).
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International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
observed in the Tadić case:
When attempting to ascertain State practice with a view
to establishing the existence of a customary rule or a
general principle, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
pinpoint the actual behaviour of the troops in the field for
the purpose of establishing whether they in fact comply
with, or disregard, certain standards of behaviour.73
In undertaking our study, we attempted to overcome these
difficulties by examining a series of incidents of allegedly
disproportionate attacks to determine the following: (1) which
actors were involved; (2) which military targets were chosen of
those reasonably available; (3) what weapons were used;
(4) what forces and defenses the attacker faced; (5) which
method of attack was used of those reasonably available (e.g., in
terms of timing or approach); (6) what precautions were taken
for the minimization of civilian casualties; and (7) what military
advantage was expected. We began by gathering any
information available about military training in the laws of war,
how targeting decisions are made, the involvement of legal
advisors in the strategic and tactical planning processes, and the
enforcement system for alleged violations of the laws of war. For
this, we studied Colombian legislation and military manuals,
news
sources,
reports
of
nongovernmental
and
intergovernmental organizations, and information supplied by
the United States government and United Nations. We also
interviewed Colombian military representatives and prominent
politicians.
We then turned to studying individual incidents of allegedly
disproportionate attack. Once we had identified a military
engagement in which claims of disproportionate civilian
casualties or property damage were publicized—usually through
reports of NGOs, the news media, or intergovernmental
organizations such as the United Nations or the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights—our next step was to gather as
much information as possible about the circumstances and
consequences of the engagement. These initial sources were

73. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 99 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
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documentary. Any clearly intentional killing of civilians was
factored out as irrelevant to the question of proportionality.74
This research typically yielded a sufficient factual basis to
determine whether a serious question of proportionality had
been raised. When the facts were insufficiently developed to
determine with confidence whether significant civilian
casualties or property damage had resulted from the
engagement, we discontinued study of the incident and moved
on to the next. With sufficient facts, we sought further
information on the consequences of the incident from the armed
forces involved through published sources. In few cases were
such sources available from military organizations, and in none
were sources available from irregular forces such as FARC or
ELN. This increased the importance of news sources, NGO
reports, government publications, and, when possible, obtaining
interviews with witnesses. In each case, we contacted the
Colombian Embassy in Washington, D.C., and the Colombian
Ministry of National Defense to confirm, correct, and expand our
information about the general law of war training and
enforcement practices, and to seek information about any
investigation of and consequences for the claimed violation of the
proportionality principle. We also sought information from field
reporters and their sources, and from witnesses to the conflict to
the extent identifiable and available. Finally, we followed up
with interviews with Colombian military representatives and
politicians regarding the specific incidents identified. In those
cases in which we were unable to identify any consequences that
were at least arguably connected to the allegedly
disproportionate attack after extensive investigation, we noted
the apparent absence of enforcement action. In the event that
disciplinary action was taken, or a formal investigation was
undertaken, we investigated and recorded the result.
Our findings based on this methodology are subject to
several important limitations. The first and most consequential
is the absence of direct access to the tactical planning process of
Colombian and FARC military commanders during the events in
question. By nature, military planning is secretive, and
74. The challenge here was in separating those killings that were allegedly
intentional but for which the evidence was inconclusive. Whenever any
significant doubt existed regarding the substantiation of such allegations, we
resolved them in favor of the assumption that the killings were accidental. This
brought a larger number of incidents within the scope of the study while
excluding cases in which civilians were clearly targeted in violation of the
principle of discrimination.
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decisions not to attack, or to change the mode of attack, in order
to reduce civilian casualties are not susceptible to discovery
through conventional research. The influence of the rule of
proportionality, though invisible to the outside observer,
nonetheless may have important consequences in practice. Not
all legal rules operate by threat of sanction—indeed, very few do.
Many legal rules become integrated into cultural expectations of
rectitude and so operate psychologically with greater effect and
universality than would be possible through threatened
coercion. The difficulty of demonstrating empirically the
operation of such influences leaves them susceptible to
underestimation. Because there is no real possibility of gaining
access to such information in the specific circumstances of this
case, our findings should be qualified by the understanding that
they may understate the role of proportionality in the protection
of civilian populations in Colombia.
A second limitation arises from the secretive nature of the
disciplinary process in most military organizations short of
criminal conviction.75 Gathering information about the
consequences vel non of an alleged violation of the law of armed
conflict is difficult in most states. It is possible that, in some
instances, disciplinary action was taken against a commander
who directed a disproportionate attack without the action
becoming publicly known. There are sanctions that fall short of
criminal prosecution or dishonorable discharge that could
nonetheless punish and deter effectively. Whenever possible, we
questioned our informants about whether any given incident
could have resulted in such sanctions, but the lack of access to
high-level Colombian officers who would know best about
individual cases constrains the ability to discover such informal
sanctions.
The distortive effect of secrecy should not be overstated,
however. A military organization that refrains from publicizing
the consequences of a violation of ius in bello dampens the
deterrent effect on other military commanders. This is not by
any means to say that an unpublicized sanction is equivalent to
no sanction at all, but silent sanctions are not conducive to the
development of a military culture respectful of the ius in bello. A
commitment to observing the laws of war should be a public one.
Finally, in each case, whether a given attack was
disproportionate in the first place remains inexorably unsettled
75. See Fellmeth, supra note 3, at 143.
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in most cases. No information dragged from the fog of war can
be totally beyond impeachment. The military organization
usually perceives itself to possess a vested interest in
suppressing publicity regarding its missteps or disrespect of
civilian lives and property. The news media and NGOs may fail
to verify allegations of disproportionate attacks, may misreport
accidental deaths as intentional killings of civilians (or vice
versa), or may under- or overstate the number of civilian or
military casualties. The headline-grabbing effect of intentional
executions of civilians in particular tends to overshadow reports
of accidental, even if excessive, civilian casualties. This is
especially true in long-running conflicts such as the Colombian
civil strife, where “man-bites-dog” journalism may cause the
unusual case to overshadow the normal case. An investigation
by the self-interested military organization that ultimately
exonerates the commander concerned cannot be disbelieved out
of hand. At the same time, an organization’s failure to seriously
investigate credible allegations of disproportionate attack
speaks forcefully about the regard in which the organization
holds the ius in bello.
Because there is no readily available remedy for the
deficiencies of this methodology, empirical researchers face the
alternatives of a flawed study or none at all. So that the best
does not become the enemy of the good, a flawed study is
preferable to the extent that it produces at least some useful and
accurate data and is regarded with sufficient caution. In the next
section, we outline the various incidents we uncovered and
investigated.
C. BACKGROUND TO COLOMBIAN MILITARY LAW AND
PROCEDURES
1. Treaties and Legislation
Since 1969, Colombia has been a party to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which
guarantees the human right to life.76 It has been a party to the
Pact of San José, which also guarantees of the rights of life and
adds a right to property, since 1973.77 Under the Colombian
76. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(1), Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
77. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human
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constitution, human rights treaties apply directly in domestic
law.78 As for the law of armed conflict, Colombia ratified the
1949 Geneva Conventions in 1961, and both 1977 protocols in
1993 and 1995, respectively.79 The Colombian Constitutional
Court has proclaimed the customary status of these protocols.
When reviewing Colombia’s ratification of them, the court wrote:
[S]ince the principles of international humanitarian law
embodied in the Geneva Conventions and their two
Protocols constitute a set of minimum ethical standards
applicable to situations of internal or international
conflict and widely accepted by the international
community, they form part of jus cogens80 or the
customary law of nations. Consequently, their binding
force derives from their universal acceptance and the
recognition which the international community of States
as a whole has conferred upon them by adhering to this
set of rules and by considering that no contrary rule or
practice is acceptable.81

Rights arts. 4(1), 21, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
Although a human right to property is absent from the ICCPR due to Soviet
opposition, it is present in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as Article
17. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc.
A/810 at 71 (1948).
78. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 93.
79. State Parties to the Following International Humanitarian Law and
Other Related Treaties as of 14-Feb-2017, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreaties1949.xsp (last visited Mar. 20,
2017).
80. Jus (or Ius) Cogens norms are, according to one tribunal, those that hold
“a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even
‘ordinary’ customary rules [which] . . . cannot be derogated from by States
through international treaties or local or special customs or even general
customary rules not endowed with the same normative force.” Prosecutor v.
Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Trial Chamber Judgement, ¶ 153 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); See also Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties arts. 53 & 64, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (referring
to “peremptory norms” of international law that cannot be circumvented by
treaty); Alfred Von Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, 31 AM.
J. INT’L L. 571, 572–73 (1937) (arguing that certain norms are “compulsory” or
“contra bonos mores.”).
81. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 18, 1995,
Sentencia C-225/95, ¶ 7 (Colomb.). The English translation of this decision
comes from MARCO SASSÒLI AND ANTOINE BOUVIER, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT
IN WAR: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND TEACHING MATERIALS ON CONTEMPORARY
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 1357 (1999).
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The Attorney General of Colombia has also acknowledged
legal obligations to conduct military operations, including
operations against FARC, in a manner that preserves civilian
life, and to halt attacks that might present a serious danger to
civilians.82 These statements, although acknowledging an
international legal duty to protect civilians, give no guidance on
the type or degree of protection required. Nor do they explicitly
adopt “proportionality” as an applicable standard in internal
conflicts. As discussed below, Colombia has, however, accepted
the obligation to take reasonable precautions to protect civilians
and civilian property from attack at all times, during peace as
well as in and out of international and non-international armed
conflicts.
Colombia has a Penal Code and a Military Criminal Code
that both prohibit war crimes. The Military Code, first adopted
in 1958 and revised in 1988, is enforced by the Directorate of
Military Penal Justice, part of the Ministry of Defense.83 Title 6
of the Code prohibits intentional attacks on civilian objects; it
does not forbid indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks on
military targets in violation of the laws of armed conflict.84
However, the Ministry of Defense distributes an instruction
manual on human rights and the laws of armed conflict to
members of its military forces.85 The manual instructs
combatants that, among the grave violations of the laws of war
is:
Intentionally launching an attack, knowing it will cause
loss of life or injury to civilians, or damage to objects of a
civilian character, or damage of a grave, lasting and
extensive character to the natural environment, that is

82. ICRC Study, supra note 39, Vol. II, at 348.
83. See Decreto 1512 de 2000, Agosto 11, 2000, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] No.
44.125, art. 26 (Colom.). https://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Min
defensa/Documentos/descargas/Sobre_el_Ministerio/fondelibertad/Dec_1512_2
000.pdf.
84. L. 522/99, Agosto 13, 1999, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] No. 43.665, art. 174
(Colom.)
http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/ley_
0522_1999.html.
85. Ejército Nacional, Jefatura de Derechos Humanos y DIH, Cartilla:
Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional Aplicable a los Conflictos Armados
– DICA (undated) (on file with the authors).
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clearly excessive in relation to the direct and concrete
military advantage anticipated.86

These instructions reflect, albeit in a somewhat loose
interpretation, the prohibition on disproportionate attack found
in AP I. The manual does not distinguish between international
and non-international armed conflicts in its guidance.
The Colombian Penal Code includes a more specific chapter
on war crimes.87 The rationale for classifying war crimes against
civilians under the civilian penal code seems to be that such acts
cannot be performed in the course of military duty.88 Although
during much of the history of Colombia’s conflict, the military
courts investigated allegations of indiscriminate or
disproportionate attack, in 1997, the Colombian Constitutional
Court held that acts by the military that include civilian victims
should be decided by the civilian criminal courts.89
The Penal Code prohibits intentionally attacking or killing
civilians or other protected persons.90 It further prohibits the
“use of illicit means and methods of warfare,” including those
“destinados a causar sufrimientos o pérdidas innecesarios o
males superfluous,” or “intended to cause unnecessary suffering
or loss or superfluous damage.”91 In addition, the Code penalizes
refusing to provide medical or other humanitarian assistance to
civilians, destruction of civilian objects, and attacks on
installations that could unleash forces dangerous to civilian
populations.92 Finally, it prohibits the omission “of measures for
the protection of the civilian population.”93 The Code applies at
all times in Colombian territory, including during armed
conflict.
The Code unfortunately does not elaborate on which
methods of warfare are “prohibited,” although it seems a fair
86. Id. at 74 (our translation).
87. CÓDIGO PENAL [C. PEN.] L. 599 de 2000, julio 24, 2000, DIARIO OFICIAL
[D.O.] 44.007 tit. II (Colom.).
88. Interview with Capt. Eric Guerrero Méndez, National Army of
Colombia, at National Army of Colombia International Law and Human Rights
Headquarters (June 22, 2012) [hereinafter “Guerrero Interview”].
89. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], augosto 5, 1997,
Sentencia C-358/97, (Colom.).
90. CÓDIGO PENAL [C. PEN.] L. 599 de 2000, julio 24, 2000, DIARIO OFICIAL
[D.O.] arts. 103–110 (Colom.).
91. Id. art. 142.
92. Id. arts. 152–57.
93. Id. art. 161.
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reading of the law that binding international law may be the
source of such prohibition. As noted, in 1995 the Constitutional
Court determined that the two Protocols Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 had become customary and
therefore applicable in international and non-international
armed conflicts without the need for treaty ratification or
municipal legislation.94 The court further held these rules
applicable in the Colombian civil strife.95 These rulings seem to
confirm that “prohibited” means and methods of warfare
encompass violations of the international law of armed conflict,
which define rules for the permissible conduct of military
operations.
In 2011, the Colombian congress enacted Law 1448, the Law
for Victims, which provided for a relatively small amount of
compensation (between 15 and 25 million pesos, or U.S. $5,000–
8,200) per victim of state human rights violations.96 However,
first it must be determined that said victim was not a member
of an illegal armed group.97 As Amnesty International has noted,
“[g]iven that investigations into unlawful killings rarely if ever
reach a conclusion,”98 the qualification is likely to effectively
negate any right to reparation in all or nearly all cases.
2. Training and Enforcement Institutions
The Colombian National Army has several departments
with responsibility for compliance with the international law of
armed conflict and international human rights law.99 The
Department of Legal Operational Counsel advises military
commanders on compliance with these rules.100 In addition, in
1995 the National Army created a standing Jefatura Derecho
Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos, or
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights
Headquarters, to supervise compliance with the laws of armed

94. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 18, 1995,
Sentencia C-225/95 ¶ 7 (Colom.).
95. See Lozano & Machado, supra note 58, at 75.
96. L. 1448 de 2011, (junio 10, 2011), DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] No. 48.096 art.
3 (Colom.).
97. Id.
98. Amnesty Int’l, Colombia: The Victims and Land Restitution Law AI
Index MR 23/018/2012, at 8 (Apr. 2012).
99. See Guerrero Interview, supra note 88.
100. Id.
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conflict and international human rights law by the Colombian
armed forces.101 This directorate has three departments.102
One of these, the Training and Prevention Department, as
its name suggests, trains Colombian armed forces personnel in
the requirements of ius in bello and human rights law.103
Although the Colombian constitution has long required
members of the armed forces to be taught the “fundamentals of
democracy and human rights,”104 only in 2008 did its training
program begin teaching officers and soldiers compliance with the
international law of armed conflict, and in 2009, producing and
distributing a training manual on the law of armed conflict and
human rights law.105 The National Army estimates that some
89% of staff officers—including all field officers—were enrolled
in such a training course by 2012.106 The mandatory education
of officers (commissioned and noncommissioned) now includes
80 hours of human rights and humanitarian law training.107 In
addition,
this
department
periodically
communicates
educational information by live plays and radio transmissions,
and has also published a training video that is handed out to
units and made available on the National Army intranet.108
These presentations specifically include instruction on the
concept of proportionality.109
The Human Rights Department receives and investigates
complaints from alleged victims of violations of human rights
and ius in bello, and works in coordination with the public
prosecutor’s office in criminal cases.110 There is, in addition, a
Department for Case Tracking that monitors the status of cases
opened by either the military courts or civilian courts.111
In the National Army, each brigade is assigned two
subsections relevant to compliance with the law of armed
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 222.
105. See Guerrero Interview, supra note 88.
106. Id.
107. Id. An introductory presentation on the international law of armed
conflict (in Spanish) has been provided to the authors and is available from
them.
108. Id.
109. See e.g., id. (discussing the example of how a soldier would be trained
to handle a civilian object, such as a church).
110. Id.
111. Id.
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conflict: A Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law
subsection, and a Legal Counsel.112 These subsections advise the
commanding general and other commanding officers about their
obligations to comply with the ius in bello and human rights law
in the planning and execution of military operations.113 In
addition, Operational Legal Advisors from these subsections
specializing in operational law114 are assigned to the smaller,
battalion level. These specialists receive special training,
including attendance at workshops held by the International
Committee of the Red Cross.115
During the planning phase of an attack, the proposed
strategy is evaluated by both a Human Rights Officer and an
Operational Legal Advisor for its compliance with ius in bello
and in particular its effect on civilian populations.116
Commanding officers may ask questions of these advisors or
seek remote guidance electronically from the department
itself.117 After each attack, if the military unit controls the
territory attacked, the Operational Legal Advisor will visit the
territory to determine whether the implemented attack
coincided with the approved plan. Through this review,
collateral damage is assessed and compared with what was
expected at the planning stage.118
An officer or soldier who is found to have violated a law of
armed conflict or rule of engagement in Colombia may be
arrested and indicted before a court martial, should a military
prosecutor so decide.119 However, as noted above, members of the
armed forces accused of attacks on civilians have recently been
subjected to criminal prosecution in the civilian court system by
referral of a criminal lawyer in the Legal Counsel. Whether the
trial is by court martial or criminal court, the outcome of the trial
will be made public.120
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. “Operational law” includes both ius in bello and international human
rights law. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See generally, CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 221
(discussing how the Colombian Constitution provides courts martial
jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of the armed forces “on active
service and in relation to their service”).
120. See Guerrero Interview, supra note 88.
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Finally, the Colombian government has recently established
two civilian agencies for the accountability of the military for
human rights violations. The first is the Consejería Presidencial
para los Derechos Humanos, or the Presidential Council for
Human Rights, established in 2014 to coordinate state action for
the protection of human rights and promotion of compliance with
the international law of armed conflict.121 The second is the
senate’s Comisión de Derechos Humanos y Audiencias, or the
Commission for Human Rights and Hearings, which serves as
an ombudsman to monitor and investigate government
compliance with these same bodies of law,122 although it lacks
trial or conviction power.123
The consequences of conviction by trial for violation of the
laws of armed conflict could of course include imprisonment.
However, a convicted violator could also be subject to
suspension, demotion, or dishonorable discharge from the
military.124 Discharge is a severe sanction, because aside from
job loss, the reason for the discharge will be a matter of public
record and is likely to affect future employment prospects
adversely.125 The least severe form of sanction is a cautionary
note issued to the soldier and kept in his or her file.126
D. INCIDENT REPORTS
The incidents discussed below range from 1994 to 2008 and
are but a small sample of the number of incidents we
investigated. As noted, we chose to include only those incidents
about which sufficiently reliable information could be obtained,
and in which allegations of disproportionate attack were
credible, to provide a factual account of civilian casualties as well
as a reliable perspective on the Colombian government or
military’s justifications for targeting decisions.

121. Decreto 1649 de 2014, septiembre 2, 2014, DIARIO OFFICIAL [D.O.] art.
26 (Colom.).
122. See Ivanys Palencia, Comisión de Derechos Humanos y Audiencias,
SENADO REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA, http://www.senado.gov.co/comisiones/
comisiones-legales/comision-de-derechos-humanos-y-audiencias (last updated
Feb. 20, 2017).
123. Talero Interview, supra note 58.
124. See Guerrero Interview, supra note 88.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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1. 1994 Operation Pincer
On January 3, 1994, FARC or ELN guerrillas carried out a
daytime assault on the Colombian army base at Saravena.127 In
retaliation for this brazen attack, members of the Reveiz
Pizarro—part of the Colombian army’s mechanized cavalry—
under the command of a Lieutenant Germán Dario Otálora
Amaya, launched “Operation Pincer” against the town of Puerto
Lleras in Arauca Department, a suspected terrorist haven.128
The army went into Puerto Lleras with three battalions and
support from two helicopter gunships.129
According to witnesses, the attack on the town began with a
hail of bullets. The Army “shot indiscriminately at unarmed
civilians for 20 minutes, resulting in the death of . . . eight
persons.”130 According to another witness, “the counter-guerrilla
force shot many times . . . at civilians who were in their
homes.”131 Following this initial assault, witnesses claim that
the Army forced approximately five hundred civilians to
evacuate their homes—ostensibly so that the army could search
their homes for guerillas or evidence that they themselves were
guerillas.132 On January 4, the Colombian National Army,
allegedly fearing an imminent counterattack by the guerrillas,
was observed to round up the villagers and force them onto the
local soccer field to be used as human shields to prevent the
counterattack.133 Part of the motivation for the attacks on
civilians was Lt. Amaya’s belief that residents of Puerto Lleras
were sympathetic to FARC.134
Photographic and eyewitness evidence demonstrates that
members of the Colombian military attempted to cover-up the

127. Amnesty Int’l, Extrajudicial Executions/Fear for Safety, AI Index AMR
23/20/94 (Feb. 17, 1994).
128. Colombia v. Alexis Fuentes Guerrero et al., Case 11.519, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 61/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 2 (1999)
[hereinafter Guerrero Report]; see generally UNCHR, International Protection

Considerations Regarding Colombian Asylum-Seekers and Refugees, reprinted
in 18 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 182, 193 (2006) (noting elevated terrorist activity in
Arauca compared to other regions).
129. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 127.
130. Guerrero Report, supra note 128, ¶ 2.
131. Id. ¶ 32.
132. Amnesty Int’l, Further Information on UA 55/94 – Extrajudicial
Executions/Fear for Safety, AI Index AMR 23/71/94 (Sept. 15, 1994).
133. See Guerrero Report, supra note 128 ¶ 3.
134. Id. ¶ 41.
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civilian deaths. Soldiers apparently manipulated the bodies
after the attack by planting firearms and dressing victims in
combat fatigues.135 Most bodies were buried but some were made
available to authorities after complaints were brought against
the military.136 When authorities came to the area to investigate
the deaths, the Colombian Army, through Lt. Amaya, showed
them the bodies, now clothed in fatigues and armed, as evidence
that all killed were guerrillas.137
In February 1994, the Attorney General of Colombia
ordered the exhumation of seven of the bodies. Autopsies
indicated “the deaths occurred as the result of injuries inflicted
by firearms, in some cases from a short distance.”138 A criminal
investigation was opened against Amaya and fourteen others on
charges of torture, unlawful detention, and aggravated
homicide.139 Following the investigation, all of the defendants
were indicted and arrest warrants were issued.140 On August 11,
1995, the Attorney General Delegate for the Armed Forces
requested that Lt. Amaya “be discharged from the Army for his
alleged participation in crimes and human right violations.”141
Amaya was indeed discharged following appeals, on November
5, 1995.142
That same month, a court martial was set up to try the
fifteen accused soldiers. The jury in the case acquitted the
soldiers, resulting in a setting-aside of the judge’s earlier
verdict.143 This decision was upheld by Colombia Supreme
Military Tribunal, which remanded the case back to the original
judge for a new trial.144 The second trial resulted in another
acquittal, which is a non-reviewable decision under Colombian
law.145
Parallel to the criminal investigation, the Attorney General
Delegate for Human Rights also opened an investigation and
filed charges against numerous high-ranking military officers.146
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. ¶ 35.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 36.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id.
Id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id.
Id. ¶ 10.
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Allegations of torture and extrajudicial killing were also referred
to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 1995.147
The Commission concluded that:
[T]here is no indication that the deaths of the victims
occurred in circumstances that could have justified the
action
of
the
members
of
the
Army
involved . . . .Therefore, . . . State agents violated the
right to life enshrined in Article 4 of the American
Convention as well as the standards of common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions to the detriment of [eight
identified victims] in the incident that occurred in the
hamlet of Puerto Lleras on January 3, 1994.148
The Commission recommended that the Republic of Colombia:
1. Undertake a “serious, impartial, and effective
investigation” into the events that occurred so as to put
on trial and punish the persons responsible.
2. “Adopt the necessary measures to make reparation to
the victims’ next-of-kin, including the payment of fair
compensation.”
3. “Adopt the necessary measures so that in the future
the persons responsible for [similar acts] . . . may be
judged by the regular justice system.”149
The Commission gave Colombia one month to submit a
report on how it would comply with the recommendations,150 but
there is no record of Colombia having submitted a response
within the deadline. No other information could be discovered
regarding the final outcome of the trials and investigations
against the soldiers.

147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 42–43.
Id. ¶ 57.
Id. ¶ 68.
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2. Operation Lightning II in Santo Domingo

In
1998,
the
Colombian
military
intercepted
communications by FARC that indicated there would be a large
cocaine shipment to Santo Domingo, Arauca (a small village
with known ties to FARC), to occur on December 12.151 The
military operation, known as “Relámpago II,”152 began with an
airlift of Counter-Guerilla Battalion 36 to the jungle outside of
Santo Domingo, from which location it launched an ambush
attack on the FARC guerillas as they went to unload the cocaine
from an airplane on the Santo Domingo airstrip.153 Later, the
attack was followed by an aerial bombardment of Santo
Domingo, apparently on the view that the town was a rebel
stronghold.154
The ground attack on December 12, 1998, began smoothly
enough. Battalion 36 deployed outside the lone runway (a paved
road) in Santo Domingo and, as a small plane landed, awaited
the FARC guerillas’ appearance.155 Unfortunately, as the FARC
approached the plane, it became apparent to the Battalion 36
commander that FARC fighters were commingling with dozens
of local civilians, including women and children, who were
unloading the cocaine.156 The Colombian Army commander
called off the attack, apparently out of concern for civilian
casualties, and instead engaged FARC in the jungle rather than
in the open where a greater military victory would be expected
at lesser danger to Colombian soldiers.157 As a result of this
humane decision, Battalion 36 was forced to engage in a weeklong firefight with FARC fighters in the jungles around Santo
Domingo.158
Notwithstanding the restraint of the ground forces, the
Colombian Air Force, under command of Lieutenant Guillermo

151. Maria Anastasia O’Grady, Buscando la Verdad Sobre un Massacre en
Aldea Colombiana, EL DIARIO EXTERIOR (Oct. 5, 2005),
http://www.eldiarioexterior.com/ForoAtlantico2/GaleriadeFotos/www.resultad
os2007.gov.ar/paginas/buscando-la-verdad-sobre-una-7054.htm.
152. Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits
and Reparations, Inter-AM. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) no. 259, ¶ 48 (Nov. 30, 2012).
153. Id.
154. Id. ¶¶ 51–57.
155. Id. ¶ 48.
156. Id. ¶ 50.
157. Id. ¶ 66.
158. Id.
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Olaya Acevedo,159 launched the aerial bombardment of the
village without prior warning to the inhabitants the following
morning.160 According to NGO and news reports, the Air Force
employed cluster-bombs and large dumb bombs161 and engaged
in a prolonged bombardment of the village using Huey helicopter
attack ships.162 The use of helicopters to undertake the attack, if
true, is important to this incident, because their high degree of
control may have allowed a clear view of their target. According
to all reports, the bombardment occurred while many of the
villagers had gathered in the town center to celebrate a cultural
event.163 Many eyewitness accounts claim the helicopters
intentionally targeted the village center and its mass of
civilians.164 The attack resulted in the death of at least 17
civilians, including six children, and wounded dozens more.165 In
addition to the bombing, Colombian soldiers illegally raided
numerous farms outside the village center166 and allegedly
damaged homes and stole property from them.167 Finally, it
appears ground forces moved into Santo Domingo, occupying the
village for more than two weeks—obstructing attempts by
civilians to seek redress with the government and destroying
potential evidence.168

159. Id. ¶ 81.
160. Id. ¶ 53.
161. Id. ¶ 58 (describing the bombs used as having limited precision); see
generally Rowan Scarborough, Putin’s Modern Air Force Choosing Devastating
Dumb Bombs Over Precision Strikes, WASH. POST, (Feb. 21, 2016),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/21/russia-dropping-dumbbombs-in-syria-indiscriminate/ (describing how dumb bombs lack an electronic
guidance system and are consequently highly inaccurate). In 2009, Colombia
obtained a significant number of precision-guided air-to-ground munitions
systems from Israel. See Colombia’s Defense Modernization, DEFENSE
INDUSTRY DAILY, (June 23, 2009), http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/
Colombias-Defense-Modernization-05273/.
162. See Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, Inter-AM. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 259, ¶ 51. Despite numerous inquiries, it remains unclear whether the
aerial bombardment was planned as a supporting attack for Battalion 36 or was
a separate direct bombardment of the town. As it appears that the ground forces
initially engaged FARC militia outside of the town, and most reports focus on
the aerial bombardment, our study has focused only on that aspect of the attack.
163. Id. ¶ 48.
164. Id. ¶ 66.
165. Id. ¶ 53.
166. Id. ¶ 69.
167. Id. ¶ 70.
168. Id.
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During the bombardment, the Colombian Air Force claims
to have relied on intelligence provided by a private company
known as Air Scan, a United States security contractor,169 hired
by foreign oil companies to provide intelligence and surveillance
for large oil fields in the area.170 Although the details are
nebulous, Air Scan apparently provided evidence to the
Colombian Air Force that Santo Domingo housed FARC
guerillas and communicated bombing coordinates to Air Force
commanders.171 Because the Colombian Air Force denies having
bombed civilian populations in the village,172 it is unclear
whether it perceived Santo Domingo as a legitimate military
target. It is also unclear that there were any FARC casualties.
However, because the Colombian armed forces believed FARC
fighters commingled with civilians in Santo Domingo, critics
have claimed that the Colombian Air Force knowingly attacked
the village as a reprisal for its support for FARC.173
Survivors of the Santo Domingo bombing brought suit in
Colombia seeking damages and criminal prosecution against the
pilots and commanders of the attack.174 For its part, the
Colombian Air Force has steadfastly denied bombing the village
directly, and in particular, has claimed the deaths in the village
center were the result of a FARC car bomb.175 It is unclear why
FARC would indiscriminately bomb a town that, according to the
Colombian government, was either friendly to FARC or under
its outright control. In 1999, following review by a Colombian
Military Court, the investigation was closed and the Air Force
was exonerated.176

169. See About, AIRSCAN, http://www.airscan.com/about.php (last visited
Feb. 26, 2017).
170. See Masacre en Santo Domingo, Arauca, COMISIÓN INTERECLESIAL
JUSTICIA & PAZ (Dec. 13, 2007), http://justiciaypazcolombia.com/Masacre-enSanto-Domingo-Arauca [hereinafter Masacre].
171. Id.
172. Technically, a helicopter could be fitted with and use bombs, but such a
practice is not usual because, among other reasons, a low-flying helicopter
would not have sufficient altitude to clear the resulting blast.
173. See Masacre, supra note 170.
174. Id.
175. Olle Ohlsen Pettersson, Colombia Denies Blame for 1998 Massacre,
COLOM. REP. (Jun. 29, 2012), http://colombiareports.com/colombia-deniesblame-for-1998-massacre/.
176. See Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections,
Merits and Reparations, Inter-AM. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 259, ¶ 85 (Nov. 30,
2012).
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However, external pressure, including from the United
States Department of State, led to reassignment of the case from
the military to civilian justice system.177 The initial criminal
court held a series of evidentiary hearings to determine the
circumstances surrounding the deaths of the civilians.178 At the
hearings, the pilots of the helicopters each testified that they had
indeed dropped cluster bombs on the village and village center,
but had done so under direct orders from Air Force Commander
General Hector Fabio Velasco.179 Velasco, for his part, denied
giving any such order, and in particular, continued to allege that
any deaths were due to a FARC car bomb.180 As the hearings
progressed, forensic experts from the United States Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) testified that shrapnel
fragments taken from the victims of the bombing matched
cluster ordnance used by the Colombian Air Force.181 Upon the
publication of this news, the Air Force claimed that either FARC
had obtained a cluster bomb and used it in a car bomb to frame
the Air Force, or in the alternative, any bombs that fell on the
town were accidentally dropped during a routine flyover.182
Based on the evidence, the judge recommended that the case be
referred to the Colombian Attorney General so that formal
charges could be brought against commanders and pilots in the
Air Force.183 In response to this finding, the United States
Ambassador to Colombia recommended withdrawing military
aid to the Colombian Air Force for failing to properly investigate
177. Id. n.184. In the meantime, a non-governmental organization (NGO)
known as the International Labor Rights Fund had filed a lawsuit in the United
States against Air Scan and an oilfield operator for their alleged role in the
killing of civilians in Santo Domingo. See Lawsuit Filed Against Occidental
Petroleum for Involvement in Colombian Massacre, INT’L LAB. RTS. F. (Apr. 24,
2003), http://www.laborrights.org/in-the-news/lawsuit-filed-against-occidentalpetroleum-involvement-colombian-massacre. Two years later, the federal court
dismissed the case under the political question doctrine. Mujica v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1195 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
178. See Otras Iniciativas: Genocidio en Arauca, SINALTRAINAL,
http://www.sinaltrainal.org/index.php/otras-iniciativas/tribunal-permanentede-lospueblos/tpp-sesi%C3%B3n-colombia/audiencia-petrolera/164-genocidioenarauca.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See T. Christian Miller, A Colombian Town Caught in a Cross-Fire, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2002), http://articles.latimes.com/2002/mar/17/news/mn33272/8.
182. See id.
183. See, e.g., Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, Inter-AM. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 259, ¶¶ 121–22.
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the incident.184 United States aid to the Colombian Air Force
was accordingly suspended.185
The Attorney General of Colombia, ignoring the
responsibility of the commanding officer, charged only the
aircrew with criminally negligent bodily harm.186 In 2011, the
pilots were found guilty and sentenced to thirty years in prison
following trial.187 In October 2009, the United States lifted all
sanctions and granted $46 million to the Air Force to improve
security at Palenque Airbase—the base where the pilots who
conducted the bombing were stationed.188 Later that year, the
civil court ordered the Colombian government to pay the victims
of the bombing collectively one billion pesos (approximately
$500,000 USD in today’s currency) as compensation.189 There is
no record that any commanders who planned and ordered the
assault, including Lieutenant Acevedo or General Velasco, were
ever indicted, discharged or otherwise punished for the deaths
at Santo Domingo.
3. 1998 El Billar Creek Bombing
Early in 1998, Battalion 52 had been actively engaged in
search and destroy missions of FARC bases throughout the
region.190 This small, lightly-armed, counter-guerrilla force was
184. See T. Christian Miller, Cutoff of Aid a Sign to Bogota, L.A. TIMES (Jan.
14, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jan/14/world/fg-swamp14 (detailing
when the United States eventually cut funding for the failure to investigate the
incident).
185. Id.
186. See Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, Inter-AM. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 259, ¶ 109.
187. COLOM. SUPPORT NETWORK, THE COLOMBIAN ARMY: TERRORISM,
THIEVERY, BUNGLING AND MASSACRES 40 (2012), http://colombiasupport.net/
wp-content/uploads/2012/04/THE-COLOMBIAN-ARMY-TERRORISMTHIEVERY-BUNGLING-AND-MASSACRES1.pdf.
188. JUNE S. BEITTEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32250, COLOMBIA:
BACKGROUND, U.S. RELATIONS, AND CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST 39 (2012).
189. Familiares de Civiles Muertos en Bombardeo del Ejercito Recibiran Mil
Millones de Pesos, Portada Terra Colombia (Nov. 27, 2008),
https://web.archive.org/web/20130710000909/http:/www.terra.com.co/actualida
d/articulo/html/acu16808-familiares-de-civiles-muertos-en-bombardeo-delejercito-recibiran-mil-millones-de-pesos.htm.
190. Jorge Mauricio Cardona Angarita, La Reestructuración del Ejército de
Colombia 1998 - 2000: Estudio de Caso del Ataque en la Quebrada El Billar ,
PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD JAVERIANA 33–34 (2015), https://repository.
javeriana.edu.co/bitstream/handle/10554/17072/CardonaAngaritaJorgeMauric
io2015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
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meant to move quickly into jungle areas and rugged rural
regions to locate FARC bases, and then to call in aerial attacks
to destroy the base and kill FARC guerillas.191 There appears to
be no evidence that Battalion 52 called in aerial bombardments,
possibly because of the presence of large numbers of civilians
around or intermingled with the FARC forces. As a result, each
time a base was located, the time it would take for more
discerning attacks to unfold (generally with larger, heavilyequipped ground forces) would give FARC members time to
abandon the base and disappear into the jungle.
During this period, FARC’s military capabilities were at
their zenith and its leaders were seeking an opportunity to
engage and defeat Colombia’s armed forces. Over time, FARC
began to track Battalion 52 with an intent to attack and destroy
it. On March 2, 1998, 700 FARC fighters, heavily armed and
well-trained, ambushed Counter Guerilla Battalion 52 at the
small town of Peñas Coloradas.192
As the 228 soldiers of Battalion 52 entered Peñas Coloradas
on March 2, 1998, they were ambushed by the FARC forces.193
On the first day, according to media reports, Battalion 52 was
savaged with eighty soldiers killed.194 At the end of the day,
Battalion 52 was besieged by the remaining FARC troops and a
relief force was launched by the Colombian military to support
the beleaguered battalion the next morning.195
More than 1,000 Colombian soldiers, airlifted and supported
by fighters and helicopters of the Colombian Air Force, moved in
to support and evacuate Battalion 52.196 Initial reports were that
the Air Force was there mainly to evacuate Battalion 52 and
provide support where necessary.197 During the operation, bad
weather forced a halt to rescue attempts after only forty soldiers
had been moved out.198 As a result, to further protect Battalion
52, the Air Force and artillery allegedly began a massive
191. See id.
192. See Colombians Reject Peace Deal with FARC: These Five Attacks Help
Explain Why, HISTORY COLLECTION, http://historycollection.co/colombiansreject-peace-deal-farc-five-attacks-help-explain/2/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2017).
193. See Nicaragua Solidarity Network of Greater N.Y., Weekly News
Update on the Americas (Mar. 8, 1998), http://colombiasupport.net/
archive/wnu/wnuota030898.html [hereinafter Weekly News Update].
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See BERT RUIZ, THE COLOMBIAN CIVIL WAR 19 (2001).
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bombardment of the village and surrounding areas near a
waterway known as El Billar Creek.199 Details about the
planning of this attack remain unclear, especially as to whether
the attack was meant to support retreating Battalion 52 soldiers
or as an indiscriminate attack on the area to relieve pressure on
Battalion 52. Perhaps it was to send a message to local civilians
suspected of supporting FARC. In the end, the result of the
bombardment was the death of dozens of civilians, FARC
fighters, and Battalion 52 soldiers.200
Colombian military commanders initially insisted, “[N]o
civilians have been affected by the army operations.”201
However, the bombardment may have been spurred, in part, as
an intentional “strong response” in the region intended to regain
tactical control over the area.202 Despite international and
domestic claims that the bombardment was a violation of the
doctrines of either distinction or proportionality, there is no
evidence that the Columbian government ever conducted an
investigation.203 The authors were ultimately informed that all
relevant commanders responsible both for the debacle that befell
Battalion 52 and the failed rescue attempts in the days that
followed were reassigned soon thereafter, although the
Columbian government did not officially report any such
measure.
4. Operation Thánatos
Over decades of conflict, the Colombian government has
negotiated many cease-fires and peace agreements with
FARC.204 As part of one negotiation, the Colombian government
designated a large portion of southern Colombia as a
demilitarized zone where the military would allow FARC
freedom of movement and control.205 Over the decade of FARC
199. See Weekly News Update, supra note 193.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Carlos Alberto Ospina Ovalle, Insights from Colombia’s “Prolonged
War,” 42 JOINT FORCE Q. (3d Quarter) 57, 60 (2006).
203. Diana Jean Schemo, Bogota Halts Unit Faulted Over Rights, N.Y.
TIMES (May 25, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/25/world/bogota-haltsunit-faulted-over-rights.html.
204. Alfredo Molano, The Evolution of the FARC: A Guerrilla Group’s Long
History, 34 NACLA REP. ON AM. 23, 27 (2000).
205. See Pastrana Rompe Proceso de Paz y Pone Fin a la Zona de Despeje,
PROCESOS PAZ EN COLOM. (Feb. 21, 2002), http://www.nodo50.org/
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control, however, it was widely known that this region became a
haven for its operations, training, and in particular, cocaine
cultivation.206 Peace negotiations broke down in January 2002,
when FARC resumed attacks, perpetrating more than one
hundred assaults against Colombian military and government
targets.207 Broken-down peace negotiations culminated in three
acts of terrorism on February 20, 2002: the kidnapping of
Colombian Senator Jorge Turbay, the destruction of a bridge
linking two cities, and the hijacking of a commercial airliner.208
Then President Andres Pastrana ordered immediate and
massive retaliation focusing on FARC targets in the former
demilitarized zone through “Operation Thánatos.”209 The attack
began on February 21, 2002, with the Colombian Air Force
bombarding the region, targeting FARC training facilities and
infrastructure such as runways and roads.210 Following
sustained bombardment, the Colombian National Army, with
more than 13,000 troops, occupied the region and discovered
more than 15,000 acres of cocaine-producing crops.211 According
to Army statements, Operation Thánatos was an unqualified
success.212 The Army and Air Force claimed to hit more than
forosocial/colombia14.htm.
206. See, e.g., id. (“Pastrana, en una alocución televisada expresó que las
Farc no cumplieron su palabra de adelantar un proceso de paz en la zona
despejada en noviembre de 1998 y por el contrario ha sido convertida en ‘una
guarida de secuestradores y un depósito de armas y dinamita.’”).
207. Id.
208. Colombian Talks Halted After Rebels Grab Senator , CHI. TRIB. (Feb.
21, 2002), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-02-21/news/0202210297_1_
rebel-group-sen-jorge-gechen-turbay-farc; Juan Forero, Colombian Rebels
Hijack a Plane and Kidnap a Senator, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/21/world/colombian-rebels-hijack-a-planeand-kidnap-a-senator.html.
209. Martin Hodgson, Colombian Army Takes Back Rebel Capital,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 24, 2002), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/feb/25/
colombia.martinhodgson; see also Forero, supra note 208.
210. Bajo Fuego Antiaéreo, Tropas Colombianas Entran en el Área que
Dominaba la Guerrilla, CLARÍN.COM: NOTICIAS (Feb. 23, 2002, 9:00 PM),
http://www.clarin.com/ediciones-anteriores/fuego-antiaereo-tropascolombianas-entran-area-dominaba-guerrilla_0_SkJ7FhBl0Yx.html
[hereinafter Bajo Fuego Antiaéreo].
211. Id.; Colombian Jets Heavily Bomb Revolutionaries, MICH. DAILY (Feb.
22, 2002), http://www.michigandaily.com/content/colombian-jets-heavily-bombrevolutionaries; Continúan Bombardeos Contra las FARC: Tres Civiles
Muertos,
COOPERATIVA.CL
(Feb.
21,
2002),
http://www.cooperativa.cl/p4_noticias/
site/artic/20020221/pags/20020221165200.html.
212. See Colombian Jets Heavily Bomb Revolutionaries, supra note 211
(“Army officials said 85 targets were hit in more than 200 sorties against the
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eighty-five known FARC targets, flown more than 200 sorties
against rebel bases and havens, and retook San Vicente del
Cagúan, FARC’s nominal capital at the time.213
Such an extensive operation posed obvious risks to civilians
living in the region. FARC fighters were known to dress as
civilians and mix with the population.214 To protect against
accidental civilian deaths President Pastrana declared that the
military would follow all international humanitarian legal
requirements and avoid civilian casualties.215 A spokesman for
the military recognized the danger of civilian casualties but
nevertheless declared, “it”s [sic] dicey, and we will surely suffer
casualties, but we have a moral obligation to win this war.”216
After the bombardment, the Air Force reported deaths of three
civilians—one adult, a fifteen-year-old girl, and a two-year-old
boy—but viewed the deaths as unavoidable errors.217 In the end,
however, the military admitted that none of the guerrilla leaders
were in the demilitarized zone during the bombardment and
that all had previously fled into the deep jungle.218
Since Operation Thánatos, international human rights
groups have received seventeen different reports of civilian
casualties arising out of the bombardment.219 Also, a
paramilitary drug trafficking group operating in collaboration
with the Colombian National Army, known as Autodefensas
Unidas de Colombia (“AUC”) are alleged to have attacked
civilians in FARC territory who were believed to support
FARC.220 The AUC had recently been declared a terrorist
organization by several states, including the United States and
the European Union.221 It does not appear that the Colombian
rebel safe haven . . . .”).
213. Id.; see also Continúan Bombardeos Contra Las FARC: Tres Civiles
Muertos, supra note 211.
214. Bajo Fuego Antiaéreo, supra note 210.
215. Id.
216. Colombian Jets Heavily Bomb Revolutionaries, supra note 211.
217. Hodgson, supra note 209; see also Colombian Jets Heavily Bomb
Revolutionaries, supra note 211.
218. See Hodgson, supra note 209.
219. See, e.g., Press Release, Amnesty International UK, Colombia: San
Vicente de Cagúan – A Community Abandoned (Oct. 17, 2002),
https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/colombia-san-vicente-del-caguancommunity-abandoned.
220. See Joakim Kreutz, Colombia (1978-Present), in 1 CIVIL WARS OF THE
WORLD: MAJOR CONFLICTS SINCE WORLD WAR II 267, 283–84 (Karl DeRouen
Jr. & Uk Heo eds., 2007).
221. U.S. Dep’t of State Public Notice 3770, 66 Fed. Reg. 47054 (Sept. 10,
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government ever initiated a serious investigation into civilian
casualties.
5. Operation Orion
In the early hours of May 21, 2002, more than 3,000
Colombian soldiers and police, backed by helicopter gunships,
moved into Comuna 13, a portion of Medellin that the
government believed to be controlled by FARC. 222 Ostensibly
intended “to put an end to the violence that had put the residents
of Comuna 13 in jeopardy for three years,”223 the operation began
with helicopter strafing of the neighborhood followed quickly by
teams of heavily armed soldiers seeking to clear buildings and
streets.224 The government deemed the operation a large
success.225 President Uribe and the general in charge, Mario
Montoya, were praised both internationally and domestically for
its success.226
As reports trickled out about the operation, however, they
raised questions about its proportionality. In particular, various
reports showed deaths of at least fourteen people (claimed by
most to be civilians only) and over dozens missing during the
operation.227 Most of these casualties were the result of the
spraying of the neighborhood by machine gun fire from
helicopters overhead.228 One report noted that “[h]eroic
neighborhood residents tried to rescue the injured and provide
medical attention amidst a hail of bullets fired by agents of the
state. People hung white sheets, towels, and shirts from their
2001) (The U.S. Secretary of State designating the AUC as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization).
222. See
The
Big
Exhumation,
SEMANA
(Nov.
26,
2008),
http://www.semana.com/international/print-edition/articulo/the-bigexhumation/97687-3; Benjamin Lessing, Colombia: Paramilitaries at the Polls,
BERKELEY REV. OF LATIN AM. STUD., http://clas.berkeley.edu/research/
colombia-paramilitaries-polls (last visited Mar 19, 2017); Colombia: The
Occupied Territories of Medellín, RELIEFWEB (Oct. 31 2002),
http://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/colombia-occupied-territoriesmedell%C3%ADn; see also Paul Richter & Greg Miller, Colombia Army Chief
Linked
to
Outlaw
Militias,
L.A.
TIMES
(Mar.
25,
2007),
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/mar/25/world/fg-colombia25.
223. The Big Exhumation, supra note 222.
224. Colombia: The Occupied Territories of Medellín, supra note 222.
225. Lessing, supra note 222.
226. See, e.g., Richter, supra note 222.
227. Id.
228. See Colombia: The Occupied Territories of Medellín, supra note 222.
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windows to express their desire for a cease-fire . . . .”229 To make
matters worse for residents of Comuna 13, after the military
withdrew, the AUC was allowed to enter into the area to “clean
up the zone of guerrillas.”230 Months later, mass graves
containing hundreds of victims were uncovered. 231
Over time, international human rights groups and the
United States Central Intelligence Agency have questioned the
success of Operation Orion.232 Although much of this criticism
centered on the military’s connections to AUC, there has also
been concern for the allegedly indiscriminate nature of
helicopter support during the operation.233 Indeed, people
reported that black hawk helicopters have poured machine gun
shots indiscriminately before the dawn.234 Performing Operation
Orion in a dense urban environment exacerbated the physical
harm of indiscriminate shootings from the helicopters.235
The hero of Operation Orion, General Montoya, came under
increasing fire for his involvement with the AUC and, according
to some, for his willingness to accept high civilian casualties. 236
The criticism, both at home and abroad, mounted even after
General Montoya’s greatest successes—the rescue of
presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and three other United
States defense contractors taken hostage by FARC, and the
death of FARC leader Raul Reyes in 2008.237 As a result of the
sustained pressure, General Montoya officially resigned as head
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id.
Id.; see also The Big Exhumation, supra note 222.
See The Big Exhumation, supra note 222.
See Mimi Yagoub, Intl Court Condemns Colombia for Bloody 2002
Military Operation, INSIGHTCRIME (Jan. 11, 2017), http://www.insight

crime.org/news-briefs/intl-court-condemns-colombia-bloody-2002-militaryoperation; Richter, supra note 222; see also Breaking the Grip?: Obstacles to
Justice for Paramilitary Mafias in Colombia, HUMAN RTS. WATCH (Oct. 16,
2008), http://www.hrw.org/en/node/75972/section/7.
233. See Colombia: The Occupied Territories of Medellín, supra note 222;
Lessing, supra note 222.
234. See Colombia: The Occupied Territories of Medellín, supra note 222.
235. See Yagoub, supra note 232.
236. See, e.g., Sibylla Brodzinsky, In Colombia, Army Acknowledges
Killings, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR (Nov. 7, 2008), http://www.csmonitor.com/
2008/1107/p07s02-wogn.html (associating General Motoya’s resignation with
the Colombian army being scrutinized due to, inter alia, its practice of inflating
number of killed guerrillas by killing civilians); see also Juan Forero, Witness
Ties Colombian General to Paramilitaries, WASH. POST: FOREIGN SERV. (Sept.
17, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/16/
AR2008091603006_pf.html.
237. See Brodzinsky, supra note 236; Forero, supra note 236.
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of the Colombian Army in late 2008.238 His resignation, during a
massive wave of the firing of high-level army commanders
suspected of human rights violations, was an apparent victory
for the law of armed conflict.239 Indeed, Colombian President
Uribe declared in the wake of Montoya’s resignation that
“[e]very military unit down to the battalion level will have an
appointed official who receives and processes allegations of
abuse.”240 Only three months later, in February 2009, however,
General Montoya’s political career took a more positive turn
with his appointment as Colombian Ambassador to the
Dominican Republic,241 a prestigious appointment to a state
with which Colombia has no extradition treaty.242
IV.

ANALYSIS OF COLOMBIAN PRACTICE OF
PROPORTIONALITY

The law and training and enforcement machinery described
in Section III.C above were not in force in Colombia during most
of the conflict with FARC and ELN, and even AP II bound
Colombia only after 1995.243 Nonetheless, Colombia was bound
by Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to afford
human treatment to noncombatants and to respect their lives
and bodily integrity.244 Also, although Additional Protocol II to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions does not explicitly prohibit
disproportionate attacks in non-international armed conflicts,
the ICRC study on customary international humanitarian law
asserts that the rule of proportionality applies in noninternational conflicts as a matter of binding custom.245 The
238. Brodzinsky, supra note 236.
239. See id. (following after President Uribe fired twenty top officials).
240. Id.
241. Press Release, Colombian Presidential Office, Embajador Mario
Montoya Presenta Cartas Credenciales Ante Presidente Dominicano (Feb. 24,
2009), http://historico.presidencia.gov.co/sp/2009/febrero/24/22242009.html.
242. See Extradition Agreements Signed by Colombia, INFO. EXCH.
NETWORK FOR MUT. ASSISTANCE IN CRIM. MATTERS, http://www.oas.org/
juridico/mla/en/col/en_col-ext-gen-list.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2017).
243. UNITED
NATIONS,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showActionDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800f3da7
(last visited Mar. 19, 2017) (detailing when Colombia became bound by the
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating
to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II)).
244. See Guerrero Report, supra note 128, ¶¶ 42–43.
245. HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 13, at 48–49, 59–
60.
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study observes that a large number of national military manuals
incorporate proportionality as a rule of engagement, and many
states have in their national criminal or military laws prohibited
disproportionate attacks.246 The International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) has also strongly
implied that the rule of proportionality applies under customary
law to internal as well as international armed conflicts. 247
Moreover, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
has asserted the customary nature of the proportionality
doctrine in non-international armed conflicts—specifically in the
context of the conflict between the Colombian government and
FARC.248
Although the Colombian government has sometimes
recognized the applicability of the international law of armed
conflict to its internal conflict, it has not taken a clear position
on the issue of proportionality. The public statements of the
Colombian Supreme Court and Attorney General do not
unequivocally confirm that the principle binds the Colombian
military in non-international armed conflicts. They do bespeak
recognition of a general obligation to protect civilians from the
effects of military operations, as did President Pastrana’s
statements during Operation Thánatos.249 The operative
questions for purposes of our study are, first, whether the
Colombian military and national police force have in practice
observed a proportionality norm of some kind in the civil strife
against FARC, ELN, and other rebel armed forces, and, if so,
how they interpret their obligations.
246. Id. at 48.
247. Id. at 49, 59–60; see also Prosecutor v. Du[ko Tadi], Case No. IT-94-1-l,
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 119
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (“What is inhumane,
and consequently proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be inhumane
and inadmissible in civil strife.”), ¶ 127 (“[I]t cannot be denied that customary
rules have developed to govern internal strife. These rules . . . cover such areas
as protection of civilians from hostilities, in particular from indiscriminate
attacks . . . as well as prohibition of means of warfare proscribed in
international armed conflicts and ban of certain methods of conducting
hostilities.”).
248. Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H. R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, doc. 9 rev. 1, ch. IV, ¶¶ 77–80, 106–08, 178–
89 (1999).
249. See generally Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenias of International
Criminal Law, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 237, 249 (1998) (asserting that no difference
in protecting individuals should exist between internal and interstate wars,
referring that the goal of both customary international law and international
human rights law is protecting individuals).
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A. BATTLEFIELD INTERPRETATION OF PROPORTIONALITY BY
THE COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCE
The record of Colombian battlefield compliance with the
principle of proportionality is distinctly mixed. The chief culprit,
when attacks against civilians are unintentional, appears to be
airborne attacks on ground targets in areas populated by a
mixture of FARC fighters and civilians. Although several of the
incidents demonstrate a strong commitment to minimizing
unnecessary civilian casualties by Colombian ground forces, the
number of indiscriminate or disproportionate air attacks casts
doubt on the strength of the commitment to observing
proportionality in Colombian military forces as a whole. In the
1998 Relámpago II operation in Santo Domingo, the Battalion
36 commander decided to refrain from attacking vulnerable
FARC fighters in order to spare civilians, even at the risk of a
less effective attack and higher Colombian Army casualties. The
commander’s decision furnishes a model of thoughtful
proportionality analysis, but is followed by the bombardment of
a populated village with relatively indiscriminate ordnance. The
Battalion 52 commander’s admirable restraint at Peñas
Coloradas was followed by a similarly indiscriminate bombing
campaign at El Billar Creek in 1998. Operation Orion involved
helicopter strafing of a highly populated neighborhood, while the
Puerto Lleras incident involved intensive bombing of a town
populated by civilians over the course of several days, destroying
civilian buildings and homes by the score. The usage of intensive
aerial bombing in areas of mixed civilian and FARC population
must be construed either as a failure to consider proportionality
at all or an interpretation of the proportionality principle that
imputes very little value to civilian lives and property in FARCcontrolled zones.
The use of cluster munitions, which have minimal precision
and maximal destructive footprint to unarmored targets, greatly
aggravated the risk to civilians in these cases. International
concern about the destructive effects of cluster munitions on
civilians is sufficiently grave that most states have adopted a
treaty banning their production and use, and committing to the
destruction of existing stockpiles.250

250. Convention on Cluster Munitions, May 30, 2008, 2688 U.N.T.S. 39
(entered into force Aug. 1, 2010).
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The prohibition on use of such munitions is absolute and
applies in both international and non-international armed
conflicts. Colombia signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions
in 2008 and ratified it in 2015.251 Colombia was never bound by
international law to refrain per se from using cluster munitions
in its operations against FARC. Until Colombia ratified the
treaty, there was no absolute ban on the use of cluster munitions
under international law. However, the use of such munitions
after 2008 could violate Colombia’s legal obligation to refrain
from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the
Convention.252 More importantly, the fact that cluster munitions
may themselves be permissible munitions does not give
belligerents an unfettered privilege to use them in any armed
conflict. The proportionality principle applies regardless of the
type of weapon used.253 Combatants using weapons whose
effects are difficult to control and inherently pose a greater risk
to civilians must necessarily show greater restraint in the use of
that weapon if they are bound by a proportionality principle. The
main impetus for the conclusion of the Cluster Munitions
Convention was not so much that the munitions aggravated the
suffering of combatants unnecessarily, but rather they posed an
unacceptable risk to civilians.254
Also telling is the consistent absence of serious
investigations prompted from within the Colombian military or
national police force, and of attempts by the Colombian military
to conceal evidence of actual events. Reported civilian casualties
did sometimes prompt investigation (as in Operation Thánatos),
and, in a few cases, criminal convictions for “negligent homicide”
with compensation to the victims’ families (as in Relámpago
251. See Convention on Cluster Munitions: Status of the Treaty, UNITED
NATIONS OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFF., http://disarmament.un.org/
treaties/t/cluster_munitions (last visited Mar. 8, 2017).
252. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
253. This in no way implies that international law obligates Colombia to
acquire more discriminating weapons, or to use those weapons it has acquired,
in preference to less expensive “dumb” weapons. As noted, Colombia has only
recently acquired significant precision-guided weapons capabilities. See
Colombia’s Defense Modernization, supra note 161; see also IAI Delivers First
Batch of Kfir Fighter Jets to the Colombian Air Force , ISRAEL AEROSPACE
INDUSTRIES (June 22, 2009), https://web.archive.org/web/20091201135650/
http:/www.iai.co.il/32981-39719-EN/default.aspx.
254. See OSLO CONFERENCE ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS, DECLARATION (Feb.
23, 2007), http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2012/11/Oslo-Declarationfinal-23-February-2007.pdf.
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II).255 Although a military trial of the responsible air crew
members for violating the laws of war, or more appropriately, a
public investigation of the planning and execution of the
attack,256 would have spoken directly to a recognition of the
norm of proportionality in non-international armed conflicts, the
charge of negligent homicide loosely approximates the legal
concept and policy underlying the proportionality doctrine in the
criminal or civil tort realm.257
However, some incidents provoked either no investigation
at all, as in the El Billar Creek bombing, or a trial apparently
influenced by military solidarity, as in the Operation Pincer
trial.258 Most disturbingly, in each case we discovered, any
investigation that did result was prompted by external pressure
from the United States, the Inter-American human rights
system, or Colombian civil rights groups rather than an
initiative of the Colombian government itself. The apparent
impunity of higher level military commanders and the absence
of self–motivated investigations of disproportionate attacks
attenuates the value of the occasional criminal conviction of
combatants or any small compensation paid to the families of
some of the victims. Examples of publicized disciplinary action,
which may be more appropriate in cases of bona fide
disproportionate attacks, are exceedingly rare.

255. See Genocidio en Arauca, supra note 178.
256. See Fellmeth, supra note 3, at 128 (“If the Blaškić case tells us anything
about proportionality, it is to call into question whether a disproportionate
attack can ever rise to the level of a war crime unless the attack qualifies as
wholly indiscriminate.”); see also id. at 145–46 (arguing that the proportionality
principle is ill-suited for enforcement through criminal law).
257. “Reckless” homicide might be a more accurate standard, however.
Neither AP I nor AP II impose what could be described as a negligence standard.
258. Quite apart from demonstrating reluctance to enforce the
proportionality principle, a failure to investigate objectively and take
reasonable measures to avoid future disproportionate attacks violates the
human right to life of the victims, which are not suspended during internal
armed conflicts. The European Court of Human Rights has held an
independent, effective, public investigation to be a requirement for the
observation of the human right against arbitrary deprivation of life in the
context of the European human rights system. See Isayeva v. Russia, App. No.
57947/00, ¶¶ 208–13 (2005).
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B. PROPORTIONALITY IN THE ABSENCE OF CIVILIAN
IMMUNITY?

Even more alarming than allegations of disproportionate
attacks are those instances in which civilians have been directly
targeted by Colombian military or paramilitary forces. On
January 23, 1991, the Colombian National Police Special Armed
Corps conducted a small-scale counter-guerrilla joint operation
with the Colombian Armed Forces in Las Palmeras, located in
the southwest of Colombia near the Ecuadorian Border.259 In the
early morning, a Colombia Armed Forces helicopter fired from
the air injuring a six-year–old child, Enio Quinayas, who was on
his way to a rural school.260 Police forces on the ground arrested
a teacher, Hernán Javier Cuarán, as he was arriving at the
school, and detained six other unarmed civilians performing
routine tasks.261 The police force executed six, and possibly all
seven, of the civilians.262 After the victims’ families brought legal
action against the Colombian Government, the National Police
Force and the Colombia Armed Forces both opened
investigations into the killings, but no punishment resulted.263
“The National Police acquitted the accused officers after a fiveday internal disciplinary investigation,” while the military
internal review remained in the investigative stage seven years
later.264 The only fact the investigation has established is the
victims were defenseless and performing routine daily labor
when they were executed.265
In 1994, two nongovernmental organizations filed a
complaint on behalf of the victim’s families with the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights.266 The Police and
259. See Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 67, ¶ 2 (Feb. 4, 2000).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. ARGENTINE FORENSIC ANTHROPOLOGY TEAM, COLOMBIA: ANNUAL
REPORT
2001
30–39
(2001),
http://eaaf.typepad.com/pdf/2001/07
COLOMBIA.PDF; See Ann C. Mason, Constructing Authority Alternatives in
Colombia: Globalisation and the Transformation of Governance 18 (Crisis
States Programme, Working Paper No. 40, 2004).
264. Cathleen Caron, News from the Inter-American System, HUM. RTS.
BRIEF, http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v7i3/newsias.htm (last visited
Mar. 18, 2017).
265. See Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 90, ¶ 2 (Dec. 6, 2001).
266. See id. ¶ 3.
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Armed Forces attempted to justify their conduct using the bynow familiar charade of dressing the deceased in guerrilla
camouflage uniforms, burning their civilian clothing, and
threatening witnesses.267 After four years, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights failed to settle the case with the
Colombian government and set the case for trial before the InterAmerican Court on July 6, 1998.268 In 2001, the Court found the
Colombian government responsible for the deaths of six
victims.269 The Court also determined that the delay and
inadequacies in the government investigations violated the
victims’ families’ rights to open access to the judicial process, and
ordered the Colombian Government to pay damages to the
families of the victims.270 Colombia was also ordered to adopt
criminal procedures to punish the responsible officers, as well as
those involved in the subsequent cover-up.271 The Colombian
Government complied with the indemnifications, but there is no
evidence that it ever punished the murderers or immediately
adopted procedures to prevent future abuses of the same kind.272
The Pinzón case, ten years later, differs only in the details
and the lack of international publicity. On the night of June 19,
2001, during Operation Arawuac, the Army illegally entered a
private home in Tame, Arauca.273 While in the house, the troops
shot to death an 11-year-old girl, Geiny Pinzón, allegedly
believing her a FARC member.274 The Colombian Army
267. See Frits Kalshoven, State Sovereignty Versus International Concern
in Some Recent Cases of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in STATE,

SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 259, 261 (Gerard Kreijen et
al. eds., 2002).
268. See Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 90, ¶¶
8–11.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See generally Ann C. Mason, Constructing Authority Alternatives on
the Periphery: Vignettes from Colombia, 26 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 37, 43 (2005).
273. See Geiny Jaimes Pinzón, VIDAS SILENCIADAS, https://vidas
silenciadas.org/victimas/23682/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2017); Memorandum from
Marcela Guerrero, Center for International Policy, to Interested Colleagues
(July
29,
2005),
http://web.archive.org/web/20110116194653/
http://ciponline.org/colombia/050729cip.pdf (regarding “Colombian HumanRights Groups Make the Case Against a U.S. Human-Rights Certification”).
274. See Cumplimiento de los Condicionamientos de la Asistencia Militar
Estadounidense,
COLECTIVO
DE
ABOGADOS
(June
6,
2013),
https://www.colectivodeabogados.org/Cumplimiento-de-los,155. See Section III
supra for more thorough discussion of the background that led to this civil
unrest.
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attempted to present the child’s cause of death as part of a
nonexistent crossfire with FARC.275 Eventually, however, the
Army claimed negligence as the cause of death.276 Although
many years have passed since this incident, no soldier has been
linked to the death of Pinzón. Some have concluded that
evidentiary errors and lack of rigor by of the military criminal
justice system contributed to the state’s impunity.277
That the execution or arbitrary killing of civilians, including
children, prompted no serious investigation or punishment for
the responsible soldiers or their commanding officers, portrays
an inconsistent commitment, at best, by the Colombian military
and national police force to the protection of civilians. Although
some high-profile cases of intentional extrajudicial killings have
resulted in criminal convictions of the soldiers responsible, such
incidents have been swept under the rug and treated seriously
only following a major international outcry.278 The relevance of
these incidents to the present inquiry should be obvious. When
extrajudicial killings can be committed with impunity, the less
serious case of disproportionate attacks resulting in accidental
civilian deaths can hardly be expected to prompt rigorous
investigation and remedies.
C. THE ROLE OF FARC WAR CRIMES
FARC’s blatant disregard of the most fundamental rules of

ius in bello subjects FARC commanders and fighters to potential
criminal liability under international law as well as Colombian
law. However, FARC military practice, unlike Colombian
military practice, does not inform our understanding of
customary international law. Private, irregular armed forces
have no formal power to change the customary law relating to
the conduct of hostilities. This does not mean, however, that
FARC behavior has no relevance to the interpretation of
Colombian practice with respect to the ius in bello.
Colombia has not only a sovereign prerogative, but a
positive human rights obligation, to resist and suppress acts by
FARC that endanger the lives of Colombian civilians and

275. See generally id.
276. See id.
277. See Masacre Finca la Galleta, VIDAS SILENCIDADAS (July 15, 2004),
http://vidassilenciadas.org/masacre-finca-la-galleta/.
278. See generally Las Palmeras, supra note 265, ¶ 2.
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undermine a democratically elected government.279 As
elsewhere in asymmetrical armed conflicts, the FARC practice
of hiding among the civilian population and using civilians for
coerced labor and as human shields drastically increases the
difficulty for the Colombian government of ensuring that all
attacks minimize civilian casualties.280
These difficulties do not excuse the Colombian government
from compliance with the ius in bello. International law does not
require the Colombian military forces to refrain under all
circumstances from any attack in which civilians will be
endangered, or are certain to suffer casualties. Common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II merely
require that Colombia treat civilians “humanely” and afford
them “general protection” from the hostilities.281 Superimposing
on these duties a principle of proportionality would add that
attacks against legitimate FARC military targets may
foreseeably result in civilian casualties so long as military
commanders refrain from engaging in attacks likely to result in
civilian casualties disproportionate with the expected military
advantage. The reason civilians are in the line of fire, whether
by accident or intentional endangerment by FARC forces, has no
bearing on the proportionality calculus itself. But, the common
FARC practice of mingling with civilians does make the risks to
civilians easier to foresee. The knowledge that FARC forces are
likely to be accompanied or surrounded by civilians would
require Colombian military commanders to make targeting
decisions with care and tactical finesse in order to minimize—or
avoid altogether—civilian casualties under the principle.
It follows that civilian deaths caused knowingly but
unintentionally by Colombian armed forces in operations
against terrorist organizations are permissible under ius in bello
if the commander attempts to minimize civilian casualties and
weighs the probability and number of such casualties against
the military objective to be obtained. War is deadly by nature. It
is a harsh but unavoidable reality that securing the lives of
Colombian soldiers and civilians, and ensuring a functioning

279. See ICCPR, supra note 76, art. 6; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. res. 217 (III) A, art. 3, (Dec. 10, 1948).
280. For more on FARC and ELN violations of the international law of
armed conflict, see HUM. RTS. WATCH, WAR WITHOUT QUARTER: COLOMBIA AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 131–91 (1998), https://www.hrw.org/
legacy/reports98/colombia/.
281. See Additional Protocol II, supra note 32.
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and stable state government, are important goals that may
justify the incidental loss of some civilian lives in Colombian
military operations.
FARC practices do not, however, justify indiscriminate
attacks, much less intentional killings of civilians. Civilians who
alternate between roles of FARC combatant and civilian subject
themselves to lawful attack.282 At most, civilians who
purposefully aid FARC forces may incur criminal liability under
Colombian domestic law, with its accompanying guarantees
under international human rights law of due process of law and
a fair trial.283 They do not become subject to intentional attack
unless they take an active part in hostilities.
Unfortunately, civilians in towns occupied by FARC are
assumed by some in the Colombian government to be complicit
in FARC’s quest to disrupt and ultimately overthrow the
Colombian government.284 Regardless of whether this
perception is justified in any given instance, civilians not
actively taking part in an armed conflict benefit from immunity
to intentional attack,285 and the proportionality principle, if
applicable, applies with vigor equal to that applicable to any
other civilian. To the extent that any reasonable doubt exists as
to whether a person is a FARC combatant or civilian, that doubt
must be resolved in favor of treating the individual as a civilian
under both international humanitarian law and international
human rights law.286 To the extent the principle of
proportionality protects civilians in non–international armed
282. Recent ICRC guidance rejects this position and argues that the civilian
is only subject to attack when participating in hostilities. See ICRC,
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN
HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 70 (Nils Melzer ed.,
2009). The present authors reject this position as unduly constraining and not
reflective of state practice. A combatant is a combatant even when off-duty, and
we see no reason why irregular combatants should derive additional privileges
from their absence of affiliation with a state military organization. See also
Schmitt, supra note 40, at 37–38.
283. See ICCPR, supra note 76, art. 9, 14.
284. See Tod Robberson, U.S. Aid Questioned in Colombian Battle, DALL.
MORNING NEWS (Aug. 16, 1999), https://web.archive.org/web/20010523023939/
http://www.dallasnews.com:80/world/0816wld1colombia.htm (quoting a civilian
whose house was strafed by the Colombian Air Force: “The government acts like
we are all with the guerrillas just because they occupied our town . . . .We are
civilians, not combatants. Why are we being punished?”).
285. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 6, art. 51(3).
286. See id. art. 50(1). The extension of this requirement to internal conflicts
follows from the human right against arbitrary deprivation of life. See ICCPR,
supra note 76, art. 6.
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conflicts, that protection is not contingent on civilian attitudes
toward either the Colombian government or the FARC forces.
International law provides no exceptions to the rules of
discrimination or proportionality for political loyalties or
ideology. That Colombian government officials have implied
otherwise, even unofficially, suggests a troubling tolerance for
the disregard of civilian immunity among government officials
that could easily filter down to military commanders.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Modern Colombian military practice displays a serious
commitment to training and monitoring to prevent and detect
disproportionate attacks. Moreover, the incidents discussed here
do not demonstrate that in its dealings with FARC and other
domestic terrorist groups Colombia has denied that the
proportionality principle binds its armed forces. Our research
has not uncovered a single incident in which a Colombian
military or political elite has denied that the Colombian armed
forces are obligated to refrain from disproportionate or
indiscriminate attacks in its internal conflict. Denials by
Colombian military commanders that accidental civilian
casualties occurred in the face of multiple contradictory reports
may paradoxically signify recognition of the prohibition on
disproportionate attacks under international law in internal
armed conflicts even while revealing either a belief in the
attack’s compliance with the principle or else a lack of consistent
commitment in Colombian military culture to observe the law.
In either case, Colombian officers at the highest levels have
historically been willing to foster a culture of impunity for
commanders and soldiers engaged in disproportionate attacks
rather than to articulate principles limiting attack methods for
the protection of civilians. Colombian political authorities were
apparently unable or unwilling to hold military commanders
accountable, except under international pressure.
At the same time, the role of the United States government
and Inter-American human rights system in successfully
pressuring Colombia to observe proportionality, to investigate
and try combatants who commit disproportionate attacks, and
to compensate the victims of disproportionate attacks, may
indicate a belief among legal, political, and military elites that
the rule of proportionality binds the government of Colombia in
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its internal conflict without a serious commitment to enforce the
norm.
It is much easier to condemn the killing of civilians ex post
facto than to avoid any casualties whatsoever in the heat of
hostilities. The guidance of the ICTY in the Du[ko Tadi] case
illustrates how the lawyerly temptation to judge in hindsight
may impose unrealistic constraints on military field
commanders:
[I]t is unnecessary to define exactly the line dividing
those taking an active part in hostilities and those who
are not so involved. It is sufficient to examine the
relevant facts of each victim and to ascertain whether, in
each individual’s circumstances, that person was actively
involved in hostilities at the relevant time.287
Combatants may well be expected to judge whether an
individual is a civilian or a dangerous enemy based on all the
facts available to them, but the facts will often be scarce and
more ambiguous in the life-threatening situation of armed
combat than in a tranquil post mortem conducted in a courtroom
or office building. 288 Nonetheless, some provisions of the
international law of armed conflict are sufficiently unambiguous
to provide meaningful guidance in the hottest conflict. These
include the requirement that in case of doubt as to whether an
individual is a civilian or combatant the individual must be
presumed a civilian, and the prohibition on means of attack that
are by their nature indiscriminate.289 It is hard to imagine a case
in which attacking irregular forces by indiscriminately bombing
an inhabited village—even a defended one—or machine-gun
strafing from a helicopter, without prior warning to the civilians
to evacuate, would qualify as a discriminating, much less a
proportional, attack.
It is unfortunate that FARC’s violations of the laws of armed
conflict sometimes force the Colombian government to choose
between a disproportionate attack and not attacking at all. This

287. Prosecutor v. Du[ko Tadi], Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment,
¶ 616 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
288. See, e.g., CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 101 (Michael Howard &
Peter Paret, eds., trans., 1976) (describing the idea of the fog of war: “War is the
realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is
based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.”).
289. Additional Protocol I, supra note 6, arts. 50(1), 51(4), 52(3).
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is a challenge that nearly every professional military force
engaging irregular combatants must confront. If the Colombian
government does consider itself bound in its conflict with FARC
then by a proportionality principle, it has accepted a duty to
forgo the benefits of attack in such circumstances. This does not
appear to describe Colombian practice, however. Our study
reveals a tension between the desire to spare civilians from the
worst effects of the conflict on the part of some military
commanders with an unwillingness to exert political and
military control at a high level to inculcate sensitivity to
proportionality concerns and a willingness to investigate and
punish irresponsible commanders objectively. An optimistic
assessment might accord with the judgment of long-serving
Colombian senator Luis Carlos Avellaneda, who described the
Colombian military’s proportionality doctrine as “still in its
infancy.”290 Supporting this view is the recently institutionalized
concern with human rights and the law of armed conflict in the
Colombian National Army’s training and monitoring practices
described here. However, a less forgiving interpretation, more
consistent with the past readiness of Colombian military officers
and courts to excuse the disproportionate, indiscriminate, and in
some cases intentional killings of civilians who are allegedly
sympathetic to the FARC, suggests not only has the rule of
proportionality not been assiduously followed in the Colombian
civil strife, but indeed the more fundamental principle of civilian
immunity has been sometimes ignored with impunity.
Certainly, logic favors the position that, if disregarding the
risk of an armed attack to civilians in an international conflict is
unethical, it is no less unethical to do so in an internal conflict.
If anything, the moral imperative is stronger in the latter case;
the world public order is premised on each state’s primary
responsibility to protect its own nationals.291 Ethical theory and
international law have not always coincided, in part because, the
ius in bello developed as a doctrine of international law, which
did not historically closely regulate the state’s treatment of its
own nationals. With the modern expansion of international law
to encompass state relations with individuals, most pertinently
as holders of internationally recognized human rights and
protections from proscribed behavior during an armed conflict,
290. Interview with Luis Carlos Avellaneda Tarazona, Colombian Senator
(May 24, 2012) (transcript on file with the author).
291. Cf. 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 119–20, 138–39, U.N. Doc.
A/60/L.1 (Sept. 15, 2005).
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the distinction between state legal obligations for the protection
of civilians in international and non-international armed
conflicts is no longer viable.292 The international law protecting
civilians is no longer grounded in the state’s utilitarian interest
in its citizens as producers of wealth or power for the state. It is
now grounded in a general concern for the value of individual
lives, sometimes expressed as “human dignity,” regardless of the
presence or absence of an armed conflict. The circumstance of
internal disturbance or civil strife may be thought to relax state
obligations to protect individual civilians as much as it does
during an international armed conflict, but certainly no more so.
To the extent our data permit generalization, the Colombian
civil strife neither clearly confirms nor disconfirms recognition
that the proportionality principle applies in non-international
armed conflicts. Critical evidence of opinio iuris has been lacking
during almost the entirety of the conflict, i.e. between 1965 and
2008. At most, it can be said with confidence that Colombia has
come to openly recognize the applicability to the conflict of
Common Article 3 and the mandate of Additional Protocol II to
afford “general protection” to the civilian population. While some
evidence indicates that the Colombian National Army operates
by a de facto code of proportionality some of the time, the
Colombian Air Force appears to have suffered many lapses in
incorporating proportionality analysis into its targeting
decisions. Whether these lapses resulted from insufficient
training and supervision, or from a conscious decision to
disregard risks to civilian lives, is unclear and will perhaps
always remain so.
As for the formal criminal enforcement machinery, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights concluded in the case of
Vélez Restrepo v. Colombia that the Colombian military justice
system “is not the competent system of justice to investigate and,
as appropriate, prosecute and punish the authors of human
rights violations . . . .”293 This pronouncement accords with
modern Colombian practice of treating attacks on civilians as
outside the scope of military duty. In the case of intentional
292. This argument has been made at greater length by both Steve Ratner
and Emily Crawford. See generally Emily Crawford, Blurring the Lines

Between International and Non-International Armed Conflicts—the Evolution
of Customary International Law Applicable in Internal Armed Conflicts, 15
AUSTL. INT’L L.J. 29 (2008); Ratner, supra note 249.
293. Vélez Restrepo and Family v. Colombia, Preliminary Objection, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 248, ¶ 240 (Sept. 3,
2012).
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attacks, such reasoning makes perfect sense. However, it cannot
intelligibly apply to claims of indiscriminate or disproportionate
attack, which fit better into the lex specialis of the law of armed
conflict than international human rights law, and appear to fall
within military jurisdiction under article 221 of the Colombian
constitution. By definition, such attacks are directed at military
objectives, and as such they fall within normal combatant duties.
It appears instead that this doctrine results not from a
logical conceptual division, but rather distrust of the Colombian
military justice system arising from its troubled history. It
reflects the pattern of exoneration by Colombian military
tribunals in cases of apparently disproportionate, if not
indiscriminate, attacks, as well as straightforward murders of
civilians by combatants. The multiple instances of
uninvestigated or unpunished killings of civilians viewed as
sympathetic to FARC implies that a protective and nuanced
proportionality principle, and the respect for civilian lives this
principle reflects, were far from pervasively penetrating
Colombian military culture during the long history of its internal
conflict.
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Appendix
Initial Interview Protocol for Foreign Military
Representatives
1) Las unidades militares en el camp siempre o generalmente
incluyen un consejo legal entrenado en las leyes de guerra?
A) En caso de que si, ¿este consejero legal es militar?
¿Qué puesto o rango ocupa?
B) ¿Cuál es la cantidad mínima de unidades militares de
la cual un consejero militar es responsable?
C)
¿El
consejero
militar,
esta
involucrado
automáticamente en tomar decisiones o solo cuando un
comandante lo pide? ¿Existen algunas reglas donde se
establezca cuando un comandante militar debería
consultar ayuda legal durante operaciones activas?

2) Como son entrenados comandantes, soldados y pilotos en las
reglas de guerra?
A) ¿El entrenamiento básico incluye instrucción en las
leyes de guerra?
B) ¿Los soldados o comandantes, reciben algún manual
describiendo sus derechos y obligaciones bajo la
convención de Geneva o protocolos adicionales?
C) ¿Si los comandantes tiene preguntas sobre sus
obligaciones bajo la ley internacional, tiene manera de
preguntarle a algún consejero legal?
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3) ¿Cuál es el protocolo para los comandantes al calcular la
probabilidad y el numero de muertes civiles?
A) ¿Antes de comenzar la operación militar crean una
lista de no atacar?
B) ¿Las operaciones y decisiones deben ser aprobados por
un oficial de alto rango? En caso que si, ¿Qué puesto o
rango ocupa?
C) ¿La organización militar tiene reglas de enganche en
la adición de las reglas generales de las leyes de guerra y
la proporcionalidad en particular?
I) En caso de que sí, ¿Son clasificados o publicas?
II) En caso de que sí y sean publicas ¿Dónde podría
conseguirlas?
D) ¿La organización militar tiene un método establecido
para medir daño colateral?
I) En caso de que sí, ¿Es clasificado o publico?
II) En caso de que sí y sea publico, ¿Dónde podría yo
encontrarlo?
III) En case que sí, y sean clasificados, ¿Existe algún
resumen? Donde podría encontrarlo?

4) ¿Su organización militar mantiene vigente el numero de
muertes civiles y el daño a propiedades causado por sus
operaciones? ¿Cómo?
A) ¿Cuáles son las consecuencias que hacia un
comandante militar al tomar decisiones que causan
muertes civiles excesivas?
B) ¿Su organización incluye algún consejero legal u otra
persona independiente que evalué lo legal del
comportamiento en el camp de batalla?
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5) ¿Su organización tiene sus propias cortes y jueces en general?
A) En caso de que si, ¿Están abiertas al publico?
I) ¿Existe publicidad en los castigos?
1) Si no, ¿Existen resúmenes del veredicto?
B) En caso de que no, ¿Cómo manejan cuando existe una
violación de las leyes de guerra? ¿Por cortes publicas?
¿Cuál otro motivo?

6) ¿Con quién podríamos hablar para conseguir mas información
sobre sus entrenamientos, monitoreo y practicas en forzadas?
¿Cómo podríamos comunicarnos con esa persona?

